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'SUBSTANCE" vs. "FORM' IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO
STATE TAXATION
Edward L. Barrett, Jr. f
Prior to 1938 the United States Supreme Court decisions dealing
with both state regulation and state taxation of interstate commerce
(in the absence of Congressional action) were phrased in terms of a
purely formal test: Direct burdens upon interstate commerce were
forbidden. Indirect or remote restraints were permitted.' Subse-
quent development in the regulation field has been completely away
from the direct burden approach. Today the Supreme Court recog-
nizes that the problem is one of balancing national versus local inter-
ests. It seeks to determine the extent to which the regulation actually
interferes with the free flow of commerce. It examines carefully the
local interest involved and the extent to which the challenged regulation
serves that interest. On the basis of such factual investigations it de-
cides whether the national interest in the free flow of commerce is out-
weighed by the local interest which gave rise to the regulation.2
In state taxation cases, however, the Supreme Court is still decid-
ing many cases in terms of the formal incidence of the particular tax
involved with but little regard for its substantive effect upon interstate
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1. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917) ; Di Santo
v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) ; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933). In
Miniesota v. Blashes, a tax case, the Court said: "The States may not impose direct
burdens upon interstate commerce, that is, they may not regulate or restrain that which
from its nature should be under the control of the one authority and be free from re-
striction save as it is governed in the manner that the national legislature constitu-
tionally ordains. This limitation applies to the exertion of the State's taxing power as
well as to any other interference by the State with the essential freedom of interstate
commerce." Id. at 8.
Substantive considerations often controlled decisions, of course, even though
opinions were written in terms of the direct burden test. See, e.g., Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Blackwell, supra; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
2. "It is now well settled that a state may regulate matters of local concern
over which federal authority has not been exercised, even though the regulation has
some impact on interstate commerce. . . . The only requirements consistently
recognized have been that the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo
on interstate commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local
interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention
of state restrictions." Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S.
179, 186 (1950). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). But cf. H. P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, Inc., 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (a reversion, seemingly temporary, to
more formal standards).
(740)
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commerce. A state may not be allowed "one single-tax-worth of direct
interference with the free flow of commerce." ' The objection to the
validity of a tax "does not rest on a claim that it places an unduly heavy
burden on interstate commerce in return for protection given by the
State" but upon the fact that it is "placed unequivocally upon the cor-
poration's franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively inter-
state transportation in the State." ' A tax "imposed upon the priv-
ilege of soliciting interstate business" stands "on no better footing than
a tax upon the privilege of doing interstate business." '
For a time it seemed that there would be somewhat parallel devel-
opments in the regulation and tax cases. From Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue 7 in 1938 through McGoldrick v. Berzind-
White Coal Mining Co.' in 1940 Mr. Justice Stone appeared to be
leading the Court (with his famous "multiple burdens" test) toward
the adoption of substantive criteria as the basis for decision. McLeod
v. J. E. Dilworth Co. I in 1944 heralded a return to formal considera-
3. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
4. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 607 (1951).
5. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 393 (1952).
6. The cases prior to 1951 were discussed in detail by the author in Barrett,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce--"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens,"
or What Have You?, 4 VAIND. L. REV. 496 (1951). Reference is made to that article
for elaboration of the matters touched upon in this paragraph of the text. See also
Sabine, Interstate Commerce and State Taxation In The Supreme Court; 1950 Term,
26 J. ST. BAR CA.IF. 347 (1951).
7. 303 U.S. 250 (1938). In this case Justice Stone first discussed the "multiple
burden" doctrine as applied to gross receipts taxes. He stated that nondiscrimina-
tory taxes could be measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce if properly
apportioned but that unapportioned gross receipts taxes were invalid because they
"placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of
substance, of being imposed . . . or added to . . . with equal right by every state
which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so
that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens
not imposed on local commerce. . . ." Id. at 255-256. See Note, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce: The Western Live Stock Case, 52 HARV. L. REv. 502
(1939) ; Comment, Taxation: New Developments in State Taxation of Gross Re-
ceipts from Interstate Cbmnerce, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 336 (1939) ; Note, The Multiple
Burden Theory in Interstate Commerce Taxation, 40 Coi. L. REv. 653 (1940).
8. 309 U.S. 33 (1940). In upholding the application of the New York City
sales tax to certain types of interstate sales, Mr. Justice Stone for the Court said
that as "guides to decision" the Court should look "to the purpose of the commerce
clause to protect interstate commerce from discriminatory or destructive state action,
and at the same time to the purpose of the state taxing power under which inter-
state commerce admittedly must bear its fair share of state tax burdens, and to
the necessity of judicial reconciliation of these competing demands. . . ." Id. at
49. Referring to earlier cases he said: "Despite mechanical or artificial distinctions
sometimes taken between the taxes deemed permissible and those condemned, the
decisions appear to be predicated on a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the
tax being used to place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage." Id. at
45 n.2. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes: The Berwind-White
Case, 53 HAav. L. REv. 909 (1940).
9. 322 U.S. 327 (1944). The Court held invalid an application of the Arkansas
sales tax to a sale in which the order was solicited by a drummer for acceptance
by an extra-state seller who shipped the goods directly to the buyer. In General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), decided the same day, the
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tions and by Freeman v. Hewit'0 in 1946 the Court was divided five
to four in favor of the formal approach. This division of the Court
was sufficiently fluid, however, to permit the substantive approach to
control decision in an occasional case 11 and prior to the deaths of Jus-
tices Rutledge and Murphy in 1949 the ultimate resolution of the con-
troversy could fairly be said to be in doubt.' Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor'" in 1951 and Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner,
Court upheld the application of the Iowa use tax to property acquired through a
substantially identical sales transaction. Dissenting in the McLeod case, Justices
Douglas, Black and Murphy argued that the result in these cases should "turn on
practical considerations and business realities rather than on dialectics." Id. at 335.
10. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). The Indiana gross income tax was held invalid as
applied to the receipts from the sale of securities on the New York Stock Exchange
by an Indiana resident through an Indiana broker. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court, held the tax invalid as a direct tax upon interstate commerce. He
rejected the argument that the tax should be upheld because nondiscriminatory:
"It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance." Id.
at 252. He also said that it was not necessary to show any substantive effect upon
the commerce: "An exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not because
of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes the tax invalid is the
fact that there is interference by a State with the freedom of interstate com-
merce. . . . Trade being a sensitive plant, a direct tax upon it to some extent
at least deters trade even if its effect is not precisely calculable." Id. at 256. Jus-
tices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented. Justice Rutledge concurred on the
ground that the tax was unapportioned but rejected the reasoning of the majority
opinion as returning to the "formalism of another day." Id. at 269. See Powell,
More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARV. L. RExv. 501, 710 (1947).
11. In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948), a Mississippi
franchise tax was levied upon a pipeline company doing a wholly interstate busi-
ness. Justices Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Black and Rutledge held the tax valid on
the theory that it was really upon the local activities of maintaining and keeping
in repair the pipe lines and compressor stations within the state. In Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949), a Mississippi privilege tax
measured by gross income was upheld as applied to a pipe line company transport-
ing oil from oil fields in Mississippi to railroad loading racks also in Mississippi
from where it was all shipped out of state. Justices Rutledge, Black, Douglas, and
Murphy voted to uphold the tax for the following reasons: "The tax does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce in favor of competing intrastate commerce of
like character. The nature of the subject of the taxation makes apportionment
unnecessary; there is no attempt to tax interstate activity carried on outside
Mississippi's borders. No other state can repeat the tax." Id. at 668. Justices Reed,
Vinson, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented on the ground that a tax for the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce had always been held invalid. They
emphasized their conclusion that form and not substance should control decision:
"This is not because of the financial burden. Other taxes may equally burden the
commerce. It is not because in transportation the same result cannot be obtained
by levying a tax for intrastate activities measured by gross receipts appropriately
apportioned to the activities in the state. It is because the commerce clause of the
Constitution does not leave to the states any power to permit or refuse the carrying
on of interstate commerce. It likewise bars a state from taxing the privilege of doing
interstate commerce or the doing of interstate commerce, with or without fair ap-
portionment even if not discriminatory." Id. at 680. Justice Burton cast the
deciding vote in favor of the tax on the sole ground that he thought the pipe line
company was engaged in intrastate, not interstate, commerce and hence clearly sub-
ject to a local privilege tax.
12. Barrett, supra note 6, at 529.
13. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). The Court held invalid as applied to a trucking com-
pany doing a wholly interstate business a Connecticut franchise tax imposed on every
corporation carrying on business within the state for the privilege of doing business
within the state and measured by 2% of net income from business transacted within
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Inc. v. Stone 14 in 1952, however, appear to be definitive decisions by
a substantial majority of the Court in favor of the formal approach.
Why this hasty abandonment in the tax cases of the substantive
approach which the Court appears to find so comfortable in the regula-
tion cases? While the Court has never answered this question directly,
there are suggestions in recent opinions that the retreat to formalism
results from a feeling of judicial incompetence to determine the sub-
stantive economic effect of state taxes upon the flow of commerce. In
Freeman v. Hewit, for example, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
"The immuities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the
potential taxing power of a State can hardly be made to depend,
in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the
varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment.
Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so deli-
cate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a compli-
cated economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a
State tax, might mitigate the obvious burden generally created
by a direct tax on commerce." 15
The majority of the Court argues, in effect, that since the Court
is unable to determine in fact whether or not a particular tax as ap-
the state. The Court recognized that the tax did not discriminate between inter-
state and intrastate commerce. It said that the objection to the tax did not rest on
a claim that it placed an unduly heavy burden on interstate commerce in return for
protection given by the state. It even said, referring to earlier cases, that had
Spector done some intrastate business the tax could then have validly reached the
income from both intrastate and interstate business. The decision against the tax
was based solely upon the ground that the formal incidence of the tax was the
privilege of doing business within the state and hence it came within the rule of
prior cases striking down state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business
exclusively interstate in character. Justices Clark, Black, and Douglas, dissenting,
charged that the majority opinion resulted in "cloaking a purely verbal standard
with constitutional dignity." Exclusively interstate commerce, they said, "receives
adequate protection when state levies are fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory."
Id. at 614, 615. See Roesken, The Impact of tHe Spector Decsiiol, 29 TAxES 523
(1951).
14. 342 U.S. 389 (1952). The Court held invalid a Mississippi privilege tax of
$50 for each county upon each person soliciting business for a laundry not licensed
in the state, as applied to a Tennessee firm which sent trucks into Mississippi to
pick up and deliver laundry. The Court said that it was unable to determine from
the state court opinion whether the tax rested upon the privilege of soliciting inter-
state business or upon the more local activities of picking up and delivering laundry
on regular routes within the state. On the first alternative the Court found the tax
invalid under the rule of the Spector case because "a tax imposed upon the solicita-
tion of interstate business is a tax upon interstate commerce itself" and "stands
on no better footing than a tax upon the privilege of doing interstate business." Id.
at 392, 393. On the second alternative the tax was held invalid even though imposed
upon the privilege of conducting intrastate activities because of its discriminatory
character. Laundries licensed within Mississippi paid a privilege tax of only $8 per
truck. All members of the Court concurred in the opinion of the Court except Mr.
Justice Black who dissented without opinion. The mystery in the case is why the
Court felt it necessary to discuss the Spector case rule at all in view of the formally
discriminatory character of the tax.
15. Id. at 256.
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plied serves as a deterrent to commerce, it can best serve the cause of
freedom of trade among the states by outlawing all taxes imposed
directly upon interstate commerce or upon the privilege of engaging
in it. From a similar skepticism as to the ability of the Court to make
economic sense out of its decisions in this field, Mr. Justice Black
argues that the whole matter should be left up to Congress with the
Court stepping in, if at all, only to invalidate taxes which formally
discriminate against interstate commerce.10
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a middle
ground between these two views: that the Court is capable of applying
considerations of substance in commerce clause tax cases which would
give a useful protection to interstate commerce pending Congressional
action. The paper will be divided as follows: (1) a brief sketch of
the substantive or economic characteristics of the problem. (2) A
discussion in general terms of a proposed judicial approach to solution
of the problem. (3) Illustrations of the application of this approach
to a number of specific state tax situations. (4) Suggestions for Con-
gressional action to go even further in insuring equality of tax treat-
ment between intrastate and interstate commerce.
I. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROBLEM
Our federal system of government has resulted in an unbelievably
complicated state and local government taxing system. Within the
continental limits of the United States forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia plus thousands of cities, towns, counties, parishes,
and special assessment districts independently assess and collect taxes.
In addition to its federal tax obligations, a large interstate business
today may easily find itself paying taxes to hundreds of separate taxing
jurisdictions.
This taxing structure is marked by its lack of uniformity. True,
the bulk of local government revenue comes from ad valorem property
taxes,'7 but even here there is variation. Some jurisdictions have
special taxes on intangibles. Many have special forms of property tax-
ation for particular kinds of business. In lieu taxes for public utilities
are not uncommon. And the trend in the larger cities is toward a
variety of taxes. Among those commonly used are taxes on sales, net
income, gross income, licenses and permits, admissions, cigarettes,
16. See his concurring opinion in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292, 301 (1944) and his dissenting opinions in McCaroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, Inc., 305 U.S.
434, 442 (1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938).
17. About 889% came from this source in 1951. 19 TAx PoLicy 4 (1952).
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liquor, franchises, automobiles, racing, businesses, hotel rooms, park-
ing meters, and gasoline.'"
Even more striking is the lack of uniformity in the taxing struc-
tures of the states. As is true of the cities, each state relies on a variety
of taxes. State lists of 20 or more types of taxes are common, and the
principal revenue producers vary from state to state. Massachusetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania, for example, rely heavily on net income
taxes for their revenue. Massachusetts and New York collect 55%
and 44%, respectively, from their corporation and personal net income
taxes and Pennsylvania collects 18% from its corporate net income
tax.19 The next largest source of revenue in each of these states is
gasoline and motor vehicle taxes, which account for 13%, 20%, and
35%, respectively, of total collections. Michigan, West Virginia, and
Washington, on the other hand, collect more than half their taxes from
sales, use or other gross income taxes with Michigan receiving 55%,
West Virginia 58%, and Washington 52%. The next highest source
of revenue in these states is again gasoline and motor vehicle taxes
which account for 21%, 26%, and 29%, respectively. California has
a combination of these two systems, collecting over 42% from sales
and use taxes, 27o from gasoline and motor vehicle taxes, and 18%
from corporate and personal net income taxes. Other variations ap-
pear. Nebraska collects over 30% from a general property tax and
48% from gasoline and motor vehicle taxes. Nevada gets 19% from
a general property tax, 33% from gasoline and motor vehicle taxes,
and about 15% from taxes on gambling. Delaware gets 15% of its
total tax collections from franchise taxes imposed on the corporate
stock of all Delaware corporations. New Jersey, having neither an
income nor a sales tax, collects 46% of its total revenue from gasoline
and motor vehicle taxes. And Texas is able to exploit its unique nat-
ural resources by getting about 30% of its collections from severance
taxes on petroleum and natural gas. This lack of uniformity is due in
part simply to the accidents of growth of tax legislation in separate
jurisdictions having no compulsion toward uniformity. But in con-
siderable measure it is due also to variations inherent in the conditions
of the states themselves. For example, a highly industrialized eastern
state will be able to obtain its revenues from sources that are not
available in the more agrarian southern and western states. Each state
has a different mixture of natural resources and industry and must
tailor its taxing system accordingly.
18. Tax collections by type of tax for cities of 300,000 and over are given in
CCH, TAx Sysimss 310 (13th ed. 1952).
19. The figures used in this paragraph were derived from the tax charts in
CCH, TAx SYsTz as 12-154 (13th ed. 1952).
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Uniformity is also lacking in the size of the tax burden. In 1951,
for example, the state tax burden per capita ranged from $35 in New
Jersey to $98 in Louisiana." Wide variations existed even among
adjoining states. Thus Louisiana's per capita burden of $98 can be
compared with $46 in Mississippi and $46 in Texas. New Jersey's
$35 can be compared with $88 in Delaware and $62 in New York.
These variations are partly explained by two factors. Some states
traditionally have higher standards of public services which must be
paid for by a total tax burden larger than that of states with lower
standards in this respect. In other states many of the services may be
performed by local rather than state governments with a consequent
shifting of more of the burden to the local ad valorem property tax.2
Hence a true comparative picture could be obtained only if figures on
the total tax burden, state and local, were available.22
In view of this complicated taxing structure what can be said re-
garding the actual economic effect of particular taxes upon the flow
of commerce? ' Consider first taxes which bear upon the production
and distribution of goods. Obviously, it is not possible to insure com-
petitive equality taxwise of similar goods in a single market.2 4 The
20. The figures used in this paragraph are from U.S. Bureau of the Census,
STATE TAX COLLECnONS IN 1951 4 (State Finances; 1951, No. 4).
21. In 1942 in New Jersey, state taxes represented only 28.8% of the total of.
state and local tax collections while in Delaware they represented 70%. On the other
hand, Mississippi and Texas state tax collections represented 57% and 48% re-
spectively while in Louisiana they represented but 67%. Id. at 8. No comparable
data is available for more recent years. Id. at 2.
22. The Bureau of the Census apparently does not collect these figures. See, how-
ever, Freeman, The State and Local Tax Burden, 26 STATE GOVERNMENT 116, 118
(1953) for a study of total state and local tax burdens in terms of percentage of income
Dayments to individuals. This study shows a range from a high of 12.04% of income
payments in Louisiana to a low of 6.17% in Delaware.
23. The author has been unable to discover in economic literature any detailed
analysis of the problems considered here. A limited attempt to apply economic theory
to an analysis of the Supreme Court decisions can be found in Spahr, The Supreme
Court on the Incidence and Effects of Taxatiom, 10 SMITH CoLLEGE STUDIES IN
HISTORY 97 (1925). Similar problems may arise in international situations. See
Bloch and Heilemann, International Tax Relatians, 55 YALE L.J. 1158 (1946).
24. See Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Coin-
muniication, 57 HARv. L. REV. 40, 75 (1943): "If, in fact, a heavier burden happens
in some cases to fall on interstate than on local commerce, this is merely the acci-
dental incident of interstate commerce being subject to two different taxing juris-
dictions. Such inequality is inevitable under our federal system, and is just as likely
to work to the advantage of interstate commerce as to its disadvantage. To condemn
all taxes affecting interstate commerce because of the possibility of such inequality
would be utterly impractical, and would result in condemning much of the current
taxation by which interstate commerce pays its fair share of the local tax burden."
See also Traynor, State Taxation and the Commerce Clause in the Supreme
Court, 1938 Term, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 168, 173 (1940) : "Taxation in one state is not
an immunization against taxation in other states. As a result values which shift
from state to state may sometimes be more heavily taxed than those which never
shift at all, just as they may sometimes be less heavily taxed as a result of the
shift than if they had remained in one state. Goods in one state, for example, may
bear the burden not only of an excise tax on manufacturing but of an ad valorem
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tax costs incurred in the production of the goods will vary widely, de-
pending on the total tax burden and the tax structure of each of the
states involved. Generally speaking goods produced in a state with a
high per capita tax burden will be at a disadvantage as compared
with those produced in a state with a low tax burden. But if the high-
tax-burden state derives the major portion of its revenue from prop-
erty or income taxes, the competitive positions may be reversed. To
illustrate this impact of varying taxing structures,2 5 assume that manu-
facturers from Illinois, Oregon, California and Indiana all sell com-
petitive goods in a particular market. Each manufacturer will have
paid local property, license and other similar taxes in varying amounts.
With respect to state taxes, the Illinois manufacturer will have paid
no major state tax. The Oregon manufacturer will have paid a state
tax on net income of 8% (subject to a partial credit for personal prop-
erty taxes paid). The California manufacturer will have paid a 4%
net income tax; the Indiana manufacturer a 11/4% gross income tax.26
Even though competitive eqt~ality can never be achieved, it is pos-
sible to make some generalizations regarding the effect which any new
tax will have upon the existing competitive picture, whatever it may
be. Assume that State X is in need of additional sources of revenue.
What will be the impact upon the flow of interstate commerce if it
selects a marketing tax, such as a sales tax? If the tax is imposed at
the same rate upon all sales to purchasers within the state regardless
of the origin of the goods, there will be no change in the existing com-
petitive position within local markets. If the tax bears more heavily
upon goods coming from out of the state, it will improve the competi-
tive position of the local producer as against all others, even though
some out-of-state goods still may come into the market with lower tax
tax and a tax on their retail sale, while goods in another state may be free from
burdens until the moment of sale or use. It is thus a matter of chance whether
out-of-state goods are at an advantage or disadvantage in competition with local
goods, and the possibility of the latter situation represents not a discrimination but
a risk attendant upon the privilege of receiving government protection in two or more
states. Tax burdens will vary from state to state and from product to product; their
variability is evidence of the freedom with which states may exercise their taxing
power, and it would be a practical impossibility to level them all down to the same
plane. A state could not look in all directions at once to determine whence out-of-
state goods came, and what manner and amount of burdens they had incurred along
the way, for such a task would involve not only a comparison of burdens on these
goods with those on goods of local origin but their comparison in relation to one
another, and no state would have the requisite detailed knowledge of the tax systems
of every other." See also Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes: The
Berwind-White Case, 53 HARv. L. Rrv. 909, 931 (1940).
25. See Note, Gross Receipts Taxes: A Change in Doctrine, 56 YAIE L.J. 898,
905 n.38 (1947) where it is suggested that 2353 combinations of taxes are mathe-
matically possible.
26. The figures used in the text were derived from CCH, TAx SYsTEMs 12-154
(13th ed. 1952). The fact that these taxes serve as deductions for federal income
tax purposes is a leveling influence, however.
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costs than locally produced goods. If interstate sales are exempted
from the tax, the competitive position will be altered in favor of goods
from out of the state. In short, a marketing tax discriminating against
out-of-state goods will probably diminish the flow of commerce into
the state; one discriminating in favor of out-of-state goods will prob-
ably increase imports; a nondiscriminatory tax paid with respect to all
goods should have no effect upon imports. If sales to purchasers out-
side the state are exempted from the tax, however, it may have the
effect, at least in the short run, of stimulating the export of goods
from the state.
If State X decides in favor of a new property tax or manufac-
turing tax or some other tax which takes effect prior to the marketing
stage, other results can be expected. If the tax is nondiscriminatory,
it will impair the competitive position of producers from State X in
marketing their products in other states and improve the competitive
position of out-of-state producers in State X markets. If the tax bears
more heavily upon producers makinj interstate sales, it will discourage
shipment of goods out-of-state without any compensating advantage
to out-of-state producers in State X markets. If such a tax is not so
great as to stifle the interstate business of local producers, it will have
(to the extent that it is passed on to consumers) the effect of shifting
to the out-of-state consumer a larger share of the tax burden of State
X than will be borne by State X consumers of the same goods.
The competitive position of interstate goods will also be affected
adversely whenever more than one state is permitted to tax the same
portion of the process of production and distribution. If, for example,
both the state in which goods are produced and the state in which they
are sold collect taxes upon the retail sale (or use) of the goods, they
will bear two marketing taxes where local goods only .pay one. If the
state of domicile of a corporation doing an interstate business collects
a tax upon the corporation's entire net income and the other states in
which it does business collect taxes upon allocated portions of the net
income, the interstate business will bear a higher income tax load than
comparable intrastate businesses. If the state in which goods are pro-
duced collects a manufacturing tax measured by the gross receipts
from sales of the goods including out-of-state sales and the state of
the market collects a sales tax, interstate commerce will be put to a
disadvantage to the extent that marketing costs are included in the
measure of the manufacturing tax.
Analysis of the effect of taxes which bear upon transportation
and communication is somewhat more difficult.27 A tax which bears
27. See Lockhart, supra note 24.
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more heavily upon interstate transportation or communication than
upon comparable intrastate activity will, of course, if reflected in lower
intrastate rates, alter the competitive position in local markets in favor
of local producers. But under modern conditions and in view of the
extensive rate regulation power of such federal agencies as the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, situations of this kind will seldom if
ever arise. The basic problem stems from the fact that any state
tax increases the cost of doing business and ultimately will be reflected
in the rate structure of the particular concern or industry. The higher
the rates charged by any transportation agency, for example, the
shorter the distance it is feasible to send goods to market. Hence,
any state tax upon transportation and communication agencies can be
said to have a deterrent effect upon interstate commerce. Further-
more, the effect of a particular tax is so diffused that a heavy tax bur-
den in one state may affect rates charged throughout a substantial part
or even all of the country. The problem here is one of allocation.
Each state should be entitled to its fair share of tax revenues from
interstate transportation and communication businesses. Any tax
which goes beyond that fair share imposes an unnecessary restriction
upon the free flow of commerce. The most sensible criterion for de-
termining what is a fair share seems to be that the tax load borne by
transportation and communication companies should be roughly equiv-
alent to that borne by business and property generally within any par-
ticular state.
II. A PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
It appears to the author that the courts can make economic sense
out of their decisions in this field within the framework of our federal
system by (and perhaps only by) accepting the following two propo-
sitions of law as general guides to decision: (1) Any tax which, if
applied generally by the states or their subdivisions, would bear more
heavily upon interstate commerce than upon like intrastate commerce
(i. e., any discriminatory tax) should, absent compelling considera-
tions of local necessity or of judicial expediency, be held invalid. (2)
Any tax which would not bear more heavily upon interstate commerce
than upon like intrastate commerce should be held valid.
Invalidation of taxes discriminating against interstate commerce
makes economic sense in terms of the national interest in freedom of
trade. As we have seen, imposition of such taxes by the state of the
market upon the importation of goods from without the state distorts
the existing competitive picture, whatever it may be, in favor of the
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local producer. Furthermore, to the extent that the tax does bear
more heavily upon the out-of-state producer the normal political re-
straints upon excessive taxes may be weakened since the voice of the
local producer seeking protection against competition may speak louder
than that of the consumer who must pay the bills. When the state of
production places discriminatory taxes upon producers who sell their
goods in interstate commerce, the effect is to deter the exportation of
goods without giving any corresponding impetus to importation.
Again the normal political restraints upon excessive taxation will be
weakened since to the extent that goods are exported and the manu-
facturer does not absorb the tax the out-of-state consumer will be
forced to pay a larger share of the tax burden of the producing state
than is paid by the intrastate consumer of the same goods. Political
considerations may provide even less of a check upon discriminatory
taxation of transportation and communication companies because the
effect of the tax upon rates is so diffused. And the cumulative effect
of the adoption of such taxes by many states would be particularly
destructive to the free flow of commerce.
Judicial application of the rule. against discrimination presents
many difficult problems, not all of which are readily perceived. In
the first place, there is the problem of determining which taxes are in
fact discriminatory."' Taxes which make a formal discrimination
against interstate commerce (e. g., special taxes upon goods from
outside the taxing state or taxes imposing a higher rate upon interstate
than intrastate commerce) have long been recognized and condemned
by the Court." Apparently even Mr. Justice Black agrees that such
taxes should be condemned." But to be meaningful the rule against
discrimination must cut deeper. Many taxes which are formally non-
discriminatory may in fact bear more heavily upon interstate than upon
28. For an excellent discussion of this problem suggesting detailed rules to be
used by the courts in determining whether or not a tax discriminates against inter-
state commerce, see Overton, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 19 TENN. L.
REv. 870 (1947).
29. The fountainhead case was Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876). Among
the later cases are the following: Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) ; Webber
v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886);
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256
U.S. 421 (1921); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1941); Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952). But cf. New York v. Roberts,
171 U.S. 658 (1898); Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1 (1918).
30. Dissenting in Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, Inc., 305 U.S. 434, 445
(1939) he referred to "strong logical grounds upon which this Court has based its
invalidation of State laws actually imposing unjust, unfair, and discriminatory
burdens against interstate commerce as such .... ." He also signed the opinion of
the Court in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1941). But cf. his dissent with-
out opinion in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389
(1952).
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intrastate commerce.81 For example, special legislative classifications
(such as special taxes on railroads, telegraph companies, pipelines, ped-
dlers or drummers) may result in discriminations against interstate
commerce. As Professor Powell observed three decades ago: 3
"When a statute picks a special subject for a special tax, the
object of its desire is practically certain to be forced into a gen-
erosity in excess of that indulged in by property and business gen-
erally. If this special subject is interstate commerce or includes
interstate commerce, enterprise which straddles a state line is pay-
ing more than some or all of the enterprise that is of interest only
to the taxing state. The danger that the taxing state will heed
the monition that charity beginneth at home is sufficient to jus-
tify the court in looking askance at any exaction on interstate
commerce that is not certain to be matched by equivalent exac-
tions on all local commerce." 33
The Supreme Court has thus far failed to recognize explicitly the
commerce clause implications of special classifications.3 ' In earlier
years the Court dealt with many special state taxes which were dis-
criminatory in their impact upon interstate commerce. The Court was
justly suspicious of these taxes and held many of them invalid. 5 But
31. Recognition of this fact by the Court has been limited largely to cases in-
volving local taxes on drummers. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) ; Best
& Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1941); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist.,
120 U.S. 489 (1887); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S.
389 (1952).
32. Powell, State lixonte Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 YAL L.J. 799,
801 (1922).
33. See also Spahr, supra note 23 at 142: "But it must be conceded that an
outwardly non-discriminatory tax on those dealing in particular kinds of goods
is substantially a tax on imports if the articles selected are such as are produced
without and not within the taxing area. Such a tax must be borne chiefly by
consumers of the imported commodities and is likely to check importation, especially
if an untaxed substitute is produced within the taxing state."
34. In 1925 Spahr stated: "The constitutional law of taxation recognizes the
significance of formal discrimination, with a few conspicuous exceptions . . . . but
gives no attention to the substantial discrimination effected by the discreet selection
of taxable articles, although a court may find it possible to afford relief in a par-
ticular situation ostensibly upon grounds unrelated to the charge of discrimination."
Ibid. The only recent reference to the problem came in the dissenting opinion of
Justices Douglas and Rutledge in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S.
422, 439 (1947), in which they distinguished an earlier case on the ground that the
tax there in question was applicable to transportation companies only and added:
"Whatever may be said for the proposition that a gross receipts tax, applicable
only to transportation companies, may readily become the instrument for impeding
or destroying interstate commerce, that consideration has no relevancy here. For in
the present case . . . all businesses are taxed alike. . . . Political restraints,
perhaps lacking when a particular type of business is singled out for special taxa-
tion, would not be absent here."
35. E.g., a chronological listing of the significant license, privilege and income
tax cases decided by the Court during the period 1873-1900 shows the following:
Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1873) (tonnage tax on railroads,
canals, steamships, etc., held invalid); State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82
U.S. 284 (1873) (gross receipts tax on railroad, canal and transportation companies
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it did so without analysis of the substantive issues involved.3 Instead
it used a conceptual notion not unfamiliar to the more recent decisions;
if the taxes were upon interstate commerce or the privilege of engaging
in it, they were held invalid; if their formal incidence was upon intra-
state commerce they were usually held valid. This judicial failure to
make the discriminatory features of special taxes an explicit basis of
decisiofi had two unfortunate results: (1) Special taxes falling for-
mally upon intrastate commerce but with discriminatory effects as
serious as those involved in similar taxes falling formally upon inter-
state commerce were upheld. Thus special license taxes upon ped-
dlers were upheld on the ground that they were engaged in intrastate
commerce even though the goods sold by them came predominantly
from outside the state, while special license taxes upon drummers were
banned because they were engaged in interstate commerce.3 7 (2) By
the mid-1920's the general statements in the earlier cases that any
taxes imposed upon interstate commerce itself were invalid were used
as a basis for holding invalid the application to interstate commerce
of new types of nondiscriminatory taxes of general applicability."
held valid); Osborne v. Mobile, 83 U.S. 479 (1873) (flat sum license tax on
railroad and express companies held valid); The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U.S.
206 (1874) (net income tax on railroad and canal companies held valid); Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (discriminatory peddler tax held invalid); Machine
Co. v. Gage, 100 U.S. 676 (1880) (flat sum tax on peddlers of sewing machines held
valid) ; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881) (excise tax on telegraph messages
held invalid as to interstate messages); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107
U.S. 365 (1883) (flat sum license fee on keepers of ferries held valid) ; Pickard v.
Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886) (flat sum privilege tax on opera-
tion of Pullman cars held invalid); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120
U.S. 489 (1887) (license tax on drummers held invalid); Fargo v. Michigan, 121
U.S. 230 (1887) (gross receipts tax on railroads held invalid); Philadelphia &
Southern S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887) (gross receipts tax on trans-
portation and railroad companies held invalid) ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S.
640 (1888) (flat sum license fee on telegraph companies held invalid); Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891) (license fee on express business held invalid) ; Maine
v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891) (gross receipts tax on railroads held valid) ;
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894) (license fee on drummers held invalid) ;
Postal Tele. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U.S. 692 (1894) (flat sum license fee on the
intrastate business of telegraph companies held valid) ; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S.
296 (1895) (license tax on peddlers held valid) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State
Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897) (property tax computed for express companies on an
allocated portion of total value of capital stock held valid).
36. In Philadelphia & Southern S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 344
(1887), the Court referred to the fact that the tax there was "not a general tax on
the incomes of all the inhabitants of the state; but a special tax on transportation
companies" but only for the purpose of showing that the tax was not a tax on income
but rather a tax on transportation.
37. E.g., compare Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941) (peddler
tax) with Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (drummer tax). See also the
recent approval of this distinction in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone,
342 U.S. 389 (1952).
38. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925) (general corporate
franchise tax measured by a percentage of allocated capital stock held invalid);
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925) (general cor-
porate franchise tax measured by allocated net income held invalid).
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Thus a rule fashioned in the context of special state taxes upon rail-
roads, express companies, telegraph companies, and similar interstate
enterprises came to be used to forbid the application to interstate busi-
nesses of general state taxes measured by net or gross income.
Judicial recognition of the fact that special tax classifications may
involve practical discrimination against interstate commerce is essen-
tial if commerce clause cases are to be decided in terms of substance
rather than form. Recognition of the problem does not mean, however,
that all special classifications embodying interstate commerce must be
held invalid.
Legitimate reasons of policy or of administrative expediency are
ample justification for many types of classifications even though they
may also have some impact upon interstate commerce. Even when
the legislative motive may be to discriminate against interstate com-
merce the understandable judicial reluctance to examine legislative mo-
tive will usually forbid its consideration. 9 In applying the equal pro-
tection clause the Court has long recognized that undue judicial inter-
ference with legislative discretion in classifying for tax purposes would
be intolerable:
"As we have repeatedly held, the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from classi-
fying businesses for taxation or impose any iron rule of equality.
Some occupations may be taxed though others are not. Some
may be taxed at one rate, others at a different rate. Classifica-
tion is not discrimination. It is enough that those in the same
class are treated with equality." 4
"That the states may classify property for taxation; may set
up different modes of assessment, valuation and collection; may
tax some kinds of property at higher rates than others; and in
making all these differentiations may treat railroads and other
utilities with that separateness which their distinctive character-
istics and functions in society make appropriate-these are among
the commonplaces of taxation and of constitutional law." "-
Clearly, the commerce clause should not be used to nullify this
wise policy; yet such nullification would be the practical result of a
39. Cf. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 593 (1914): "The present act does not
on its face manifest a purpose to interfere with interstate commerce, and we are
unable to accept the historical facts alluded to as sufficient evidence of a sinister
purpose, such as would justify this court in striking down the law. We could not
do this without in effect denouncing the legislature of the State as guilty of a
conscious attempt to evade the obligations of the Federal Constitution." But cf.
Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951).
40. Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 121 (1941).
41. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 (1940).
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rule that interstate commerce business cannot be subjected to any taxes
other than those of the widest general applicability.
Here, then, is an exceedingly difficult problem, but one of a kind
familiar to the courts in the application of the commerce clause in regu-
lation cases. In essence what the court must determine in each case
is whether the risk that interstate commerce will be subjected to a dis-
criminatory burden is outweighed by the local interest in freedom to
classify for tax purposes. The policy of the commerce clause would
justify invalidating narrow classifications embodying predominantly
interstate commerce business; the local interest in freedom of classifi-
cation would justify upholding broader classifications which include
predominantly local business. Political restraints upon excessive taxa-
tion would, of course, be weak in the former case, strong in the latter.
Thus the courts might well condemn special taxes on railroads (in
states where their business is predominantly interstate) and yet uphold
special taxes on broader classes such as-corporations or manufacturing.
Difficult borderline cases exist here as in other areas of application of
the commerce clause, but at least considerations of substance can be
applied in arriving at their solution.
Failure of the state to apportion properly a particular tax to activ-
ities or property within the state may also involve problems of discrim-
ination. While apportionment has been largely a due process con-
cept, it also has commerce clause implications. An unapportioned tax
is in effect discriminatory as to subject though not as to rate.4 A local
business is taxed only upon property, activities or income located or
arising within the boundaries of the state. To apply the same tax
without apportionment to the interstate enterprise is to tax it upon
a broader subject-property activities and income located or arising
outside as well as inside the state. While this form of discrimination
does not involve the same type of danger as special classification (i. e.,
the normal political restraints upon an excessive rate of taxation are
present) it does involve the equally substantial danger that the same
property, activities or income may be subjected to taxation by more
than one state. Local business bears only one state tax upon its entire
business or property, but if the states are permitted to reach beyond
their boundaries for taxable subjects interstate business may pay sev-
eral state taxes upon its entire business. States may be reckoned as
self-contained units free to frame their own taxing systems without
heeding systems elsewhere if, and only if, the collector's greedy hand
is stopped at the borders.
42. Mr. Justice Black apparently contends that unapportioned taxes do not in-
volve discrimination against interstate commerce. See his dissent in Gwin, White &
Prince v. Henneford, Inc., 305 U.S. 434, 442 (1939).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized this problem and re-
quired apportionment in most state taxing situations. In the earlier
cases the rationale was essentially due process, although commerce
clause language was also used.' More recently the requirement of
apportionment has been justified in terms of the "multiple burden" ap-
proach: An unapportioned tax, though nominally local, "in its prac-
tical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it im-
poses upon it, merely because interstate commerce is being done, the
risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is not exposed." "1
In one area the Court apparently has found that local policy is strong
enough to outweigh the national policy in favor of apportionrhient.
Although there are no recent cases in which the matter has been dis-
cussed, it appears settled that net income taxes and franchise taxes
measured by net income, property or capital stock may be applied to
individuals domiciled within the state and to domestic corporations
without apportionment, even though such taxes may frequently impose
substantial burdens on interstate commerce.45 Further judicial exam-
ination of the decisions in this area appears unlikely and for the moment
unnecessary, however, since most states seem to have found that the
local interest is best served by not discouraging the interstate opera-
tions of domiciliaries and voluntarily provide for apportionment. One
other problem arises from the fact that some taxes, such as sales and
license taxes, 4 a do not readily lend themselves to apportionment.
At best, however, courts can do only a partial job in the appor-
tionment field.4' Obviously, they are not competent to formulate and
impose upon all states uniform apportionment formulas. As each indi-
vidual apportionment formula comes before it, the Court can do no
43. The cases are discussed in Barrett, szpra note 6, at 497 et seq.
44. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, Inc., 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939). See
also Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); and Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
45. The net income tax cases are cited and discussed in ALTMAN & KEESLING,
ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 30 (2d ed. 1950). See also Rock Island
Refining Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 322 U.S. 711 (1944) (per curiam opinion).
For cases upholding franchise taxes on domestic corporations doing interstate busi-
ness in several states measured by the entire capital stock, see Kansas City, M. &
B. R.R. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916); Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. v. Botkin, 240
U.S. 227 (1916); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325
(1920) ; and cf. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313
(1939).
For a suggestion that the present Court may be reluctant to uphold the right
of domiciliary states to tax without apportionment, see Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,
342 U.S. 382 (1952), denying the state of domicile the right to impose a property
tax on the entire value of a fleet of river boats and barges.
45a. The special problems concerning these taxes will be dealt with at length
later in this paper.
46. ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. supra note 45. Silverstein, Problems of Ap-
portionvient in Taxation of Multistate Busiwss, 4 TAx L. REV. 207 (1949).
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more than recognize that "by its very nature the problem is incapable
of precise and arithmetical solution" and uphold the local formula
unless it can be shown "to project the taxing power of the state plainly
beyond its borders." 17 Frequently, this action may result in subjecting
the interstate enterprise to some degree of multiple taxation since the
amounts allocated to the various states involved can easily exceed
100%. A complete solution of the apportionment problem can come
only as a result of Congressional action. Suggestions for such action
will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
Application of the second proposition, that nondiscriminatory
state taxes should be upheld whatever their relationship to interstate
commerce, would run counter to the trend of recent decisions of the
Supreme Court. But to the author no valid reason of substance ap-
pears why any state tax of wide general application, nondiscriminatory
in rate and fairly apportioned to activities within the state, should not
be sustained whatever its formal incidence. Take the Spector Motor
case as an example. The Court holds there that a corporate franchise
tax, applicable to all corporations doing business within the state, on
the privilege of doing such business measured by net income properly
apportioned to income from activities within the state cannot be ap-
plied to a wholly interstate business. Yet it says that such a tax can
apply to the net income from all business done within the state, includ-
ing interstate business, earned by any concern which does some intra-
state business, however small and unprofitable it may be. Is there any
justification of substance for such a distinction? Why should a tax
be held invalid if placed "directly" upon interstate commerce and yet
upheld if its formal incidence is some local incident of the commerce?
Why should a tax upon the sale of the goods be forbidden when the
goods are ordered across state lines prior to shipment when a similar
tax with the same economic effects upon the flow of commerce is sus-
tained if the goods enter the state before the sale is made, or if the tax
is imposed upon the storage or use of the goods immediately after they
enter the state?
What are the justifications that the Court gives for these distinc-
tions? First, there is the appeal to precedent. "The cases abound in
statements to the effect that the privilege of carrying on interstate
commerce itself is immune from state taxation." 48 "[T]his Court has
never interpreted the commerce clause to allow a state tax for the priv-
47. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 365 (1940). See
also International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947).
48. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 677 (1948) (Mr. Justice
Reed's dissent).
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ilege of carrying on interstate commerce or one upon that commerce
itself." " The short answer to this argument may well be that there
is no valid reason for permitting the confusions of the past to control
the future. A longer answer, which cannot be spelled out in detail
here, would suggest that the precedents are not nearly so clear as the
Court suggests when re-examined in terms of what was actually de-
cided as opposed to what was said. Prior to 1918 the only important
nondiscriminatory tax of general applicability that the Supreme Court
was asked to rule upon was the ad valorem property tax and the Court
went to great lengths to sustain its application. Not only was the phys-
ical property of concerns engaged in interstate commerce subjected
to this tax, but the states were also permitted to get at a fair propor-
tion of the intangible unitary value of interstate transportation and
communication companies.5 ° Beginning in 1918 the Court decided sev-
eral cases involving apportioned general taxes on (or measured by)
net income in which the taxes were upheld even though applied to net
income derived from interstate commerce activities." A few cor-
porate franchise taxes, properly apportioned, were also upheld. 2 But
most of the taxes which came before the Court were either special
taxes r3 (such as taxes on railroads, express companies or telegraph
companies) or taxes which sought to impose clearly discriminatory
burdens on foreign corporations under the guise of the privilege to
exclude. 4 While the Court rarely alluded to the special problems of
discrimination involved in special taxes and instead talked in terms of
forbidding taxes upon interstate commerce or the privilege of engag-
ing in it, the actual decisions were consistent with the affirmative rule
stated herein. In his monumental review of the cases in Harvard Law
Review in 1919 Professor Thomas Reed Powell concluded that there
was no precedent against application of a general net income tax even
to a company doing a wholly interstate business.5 He argued that a
49. Id. at 680.
50. The cases are discussed in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Au-
thority by the Taxing Powers of the States. V., 32 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1919).
51. U.S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918); Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37 (1920); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) ;
Atlantic Coast Line RLRL v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923); Matson Navigation
Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
52. E.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914).
53. E.g., cases cited supra note 35.
54. E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Looney v.
Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); International Paper Co. v. Mass., 246 U.S. 135
(1918). This whole line of cases is discussed in Powell, Indirect Enrocachnmnt
on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States. II., 31 HARv. L. REv.
572 (1918).
55. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers
of the States. VII., 32 HARV. L. RZv. 634, 639 (1919).
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similar rule might not be entirely foreclosed if a general gross receipts
tax should come before the Court (an event he thought unlikely).
And he thought that such general taxes might be sustainable, even
though imposed upon the privilege of doing business, on the theory
that in substance they were the same as taxes on income itself." As
late as 1921, Professor Powell was able to generalize: "All the cases
which have declared that the States cannot tax interstate commerce
will be found to be cases involving special rather than general taxes.
Whenever it has been certain that interstate commerce could not in
some way be discriminated against, the tax has been sustained." " In
1925 the Court held invalid two allocated state franchise taxes upon
foreign corporations on the ground that any excise tax on a company
doing exclusively interstate business "burdens interstate commerce and
is therefore invalid without regard to measure or amount." 58 It was
not until the Puget Sound Stevedoring " case in 1937 that the Court
held invalid a tax of wide general applicability properly apportioned
to activities within the state (a tax for the privilege of engaging in
business activities within the state measured by gross receipts). Clearly,
then, precedent alone (at least aged precedent) is not enough to compel
the Court to go on invalidating states taxes upon formal grounds which
have no relation to substance.
Second, there is the argument based on principle. This argument
appears to run somewhat along the following lines. (1) The com-
merce clause "by its own force created an area of trade free from
interference by the States." 60 Time and again it has been said that
the purpose of the commerce clause was to create an area of free
trade among the states."' (2) This free trade notion goes further
than merely restraining the states from imposing duties or imposts on
imports and exports-more than state protective tariffs is outlawed.
Nondiscriminatory state taxes may also be banned.
"Of course a State is not required to give active advantage
to interstate trade. But it cannot aim to control that trade even
56. Id. at 640.
57. Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit. IV., 7 VA. L. REv. 497, 531 (1921).
58. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U.S. 203, 217 (1925); Ozark Pipe
Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925).
59. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); cf.
Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) (same tax held
invalid as applied to unapportioned gross receipts of radio station).
60. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
61. See Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Min. Co., 309 U.S. 33, 61 (1940); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327, 330 (1944) ("The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area
of free trade among the several States.") ; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co.,
330 U.S. 422, 428 (1947) ; Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in Interstate Oil Pipe Line
Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 682 (1949).
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though it desires to control its own. It cannot justify what
amounts to a levy upon the very process of commerce across States
lines by pointing to a similar hobble on its local trade. It is true
that the existence of a tax on its local commerce detracts from
the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate commerce to the extent
that it removes the temptation to sell the goods locally. But the
fact of such a tax, in any event, puts impediments upon the cur-
rents of commerce across the State line, while the aim of the
Commerce Clause was precisely to prevent States from exacting
toll from those engaged in national commerce." 62
(3) But on the other hand this free trade idea does not exclude all
state taxation which impinges on interstate commerce. By selecting
the right kinds of taxes the states may make interstate commerce pay
its way. 3  The distinction between the permissible and the impermis-
sible in the field of state taxation is not, however, based upon consid-
erations of substance. A tax may be invalid though it is nondiscrim-
inatory, is fairly apportioned, and does not place an unduly heavy bur-
den on commerce. "Even though the financial burden on interstate
commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may validly
make interstate commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the
constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so." 64 (4)
Two justifications are given for banning certain nondiscriminatory
state taxes. Taxes imposed upon the privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce are invalid because the commerce clause delegated to
the national government "the exclusive power to tax the privilege to
engage in interstate commerce." 65 Since the commerce clause takes
away from the states the power to permit or refuse the carrying on of
interstate commerce they cannot impose a tax for a privilege which
they did not grant. Taxes directly upon interstate commerce are
invalid because they interfere with the freedom of interstate com-
62. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946); see also Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422, 433 (1947); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 607 (1951).
63. In Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946) "in an effort to show that the
reach of the Commerce Clause did not destroy the state's power to make commerce
pay its way" the Court "elaborated the fact that taxes on the commerce itself was
not the sole source of state revenue from that commerce." Quotation from Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429 (1947).
64. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
65. Ibid. What the Court actually said must have caused Chief Justice Marshall
to spin in his grave: "Taxing power is inherent in sovereign states, yet the states
of the United States have divided their taxing power between the Federal Govern-
ment and themselves. They delegated to the United States the exclusive power to
tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce when they gave Congress the
power 'To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States. . . .'" Ibid. Yet the Court concluded its opinion with a reference to
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819), in which Marshall made his
strongest argument that the powers of the federal government came not from the
states but from the people.
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merce0 6 In some unexplained manner they constitute a special bur-
den. "Trade being a sensitive plant, a direct tax upon it to some
extent at least deters trade even if its effect is not precisely calcul-
able." 67
Several observations can be made regarding these lines of argu-
ment. In the first place, the idea of commerce flowing freely back
and forth across the map of the United States is an attractive one.
This flow would be the greatest, of course, if such commerce were
entirely freed from state taxation, but a premium upon interstate ship-
ment of goods to market could result in as uneconomical a system of
distribution of goods as could a penalty. Hence, even the advocates
of this theory agree that interstate commerce sbould be required to
contribute its fair share to the cost of state and local government. Con-
ceding this proposition, why should there be any limitation except one
forbidding discriminatory state taxation? Is there any substantive
content to the notion that a tax which bears directly upon interstate
commerce is more restrictive of that commerce than one which bears
only indirectly? Can it be said, for example, that a sales tax has a
greater deterrent effect upon interstate sales than a use tax? True,
trade is a sensitive plant and a direct tax upon it, to some extent at
least, deters trade. But the same is true of a tax imposed anywhere in
the productive process which adds to the costs of carrying on the trade,
whether its incidence be termed "direct" or "indirect." Two other
suggestions have been made to give substance to this argument. In
Freeman v. Hewit, Justice Frankfurter said: "It is immaterial that
local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance. It may com-
mend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral instead of an industrial
society." 08 But this is another problem. Take for example a state
tax of 25 cents per pound on all oleomargarine sold within the state.
This is not a general tax for revenue, it is a special tax for regulatory
purposes and should be so treated by the Court. 9 The determination
of its validity would depend on the kind of balancing of state policy
against national interest which is involved in all state regulation cases.
The second suggestion was made by Justice Reed in Joseph v. Carter
& Weekes Steve. Co., in which he said that the rule used there to inval-
idate a general gross receipts tax as applied to stevedoring "has reason
to support it in the likelihood that such legislation will flourish more
luxuriantly where the most revenue will come from foreign or inter-
66. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422, 433 (1947).
67. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 257 (1946).
68. Id. at 252
69. But. cf. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
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state commerce. Thus in port cities and transportation or handling
centers, without discrimination against out-of-state as compared with
local business, larger proportions of necessary revenue could be ob-
tained from the flow of commerce." 70 The answer to this argument,
of course, is that port cities and transportation centers through which
large quantities of commerce flow must pay the costs of increased gov-
ernmental services. If the tax take from interstate commerce cannot
be proportioned roughly to the amount of that commerce, such areas
will be forced either to reduce the level of governmental services or to
call upon local commerce to subsidize interstate commerce.
The Court has remarked that "revenue serves as well no matter
what its course" and hence the states can secure interstate commerce
contributions to the cost of government from the types of taxes hitherto
held permissible.7 ' This argument, however, disregards the many col-
lateral consequences of a shift from one source of revenue to another.
A state, for example, may seek to supplement property taxation by net
income or gross receipts taxes in order that firms doing a large volume
of business with comparatively little real or tangible personal property
may contribute their fair share to the cost of government. If the state
is told that wholly interstate enterprises must be exempted from these
income taxes it must either increase the rate of the property tax or of
some other tax which bears in a different way upon business. Many
taxpayers would say that the fairest type of state tax is probably that
based on net income. Yet if the Spector Motor case means that con-
cerns doing a wholly interstate business are exempt from such a tax,
its use may be made difficult if not impossible in many states. Further-
more, a premium is put upon establishing an artificial type of business
structure so as to avoid doing any local business in as many states as
possible.
Nor are the arguments against the imposition of a privilege tax
upon the doing of interstate commerce any more compelling. True,
the states cannot prevent the doing of an interstate business. Hence
they cannot enforce a privilege tax, or any other kind of a tax, by
excluding the taxpayer from the doing of interstate business until the
tax is paid. True, also, a tax upon only the privilege of engaging in
interstate business would be invalid. But is there any reason why the
application of a general tax upon every corporation carrying on busi-
ness in the state for the privilege of doing such business should, when
applied to a corporation doing only interstate business, be termed (as
the Court did in Spector Motor) a tax on the privilege of doing inter-
70. 330 U.S. 442, 433 (1947).
71. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
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state business ? If the conceptual notion that since the state does not
grant the privilege to do intertsate business it may not tax it proves
too strong for the courts to overcome, why not then look to the sub-
stance of the matter and say that the tax will be treated as though it
were upon net income or gross receipts or whatever the measure, and
disregard the formal incidence, which does not in any event affect the
impact of the tax upon commerce? 2
In the cases dealing with the power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce the Court has abandoned in recent years formal dis-
tinctions between "direct" and "indirect" effects upon commerce for a
test which looks to the economic effect upon commerce of the activities
to be regulated.7' Judgment as to "practical impeding effects" upon
interstate commerce has been substituted "for rubrics concerning its
boundaries." " Hence it is unnecessary "to search for some sharp
point or line where interstate commerce ends and intrastate commerce
begins ;" "' the flow of commerce in sugar, for example, may be affected
by disrupting the planting of sugar beet seeds as well as by directly
burdening the interstate shipment of the sugar.
In the field of state taxation, however, the Court has continued
to apply the old formal distinctions. Taxes imposed upon intrastate
commerce are upheld regardless of their impact upon the flow of inter-
state commerce unless they involve a formal and obvious discrimination
against that commerce. Taxes imposed directly upon interstate com-
merce may be held invalid even though they are nondiscriminatory and
do not constitute in substance a deterrent to that commerce. And even
more subtle distinctions are sometimes drawn when taxes upon business
engaged wholly in interstate commerce activity are upheld on the theory
that their formal incidence is upon a mere "local incident" of the inter-
state commerce.7
Acceptance of the propositions suggested above as a general guide
to decision would largely free the Court from these formal distinc-
72. Professor Powell so argued in 1919 and made then the all too optimistic predic-
tion that the Court would come to treat general franchise and privilege taxes measured
by net income in the same fashion as taxes "on" net income and hence sustain them
even where solely interstate business is involved. Powell, Indirect Encroachmet4
on Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of the States. VII., 32 HAgv. L. REv.
634, 648 (1919).
73. The cases are reviewed in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
74. Id. at 233.
75. Id. at 232.
76. E.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). See also the
excellent discussion in Martin Ship Service Co. v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 793. 215
P.2d 24 (1950).
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tions. In broad terms the question in each case (whether interstate
or intrastate commerce is the formal subject of the tax) would be does
the tax have in substance an adverse effect upon interstate commerce
which is not outweighed by some legitimate local interest. On the one
hand, any disadvantage that may accrue to interstate commerce from
general nondiscriminatory state taxation is far outweighed by the
necessity that state and local governments be able to receive revenue
from all business activities within their borders to pay for govern-
mental services rendered. On the other hand, formally discrimina-
tory or unapportioned state taxes impose obvious burdens on inter-
state commerce which seldom can be justified in terms of local need.
In intermediate areas the problem is, of course, more difficult, but in
most fields of taxation the decisions can be based upon substantive
considerations rather than formal distinctions.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
No elaboration of general principles can be held satisfactory until
it has withstood the test of application to specific cases. In this section
of the paper an attempt will be made to suggest with reference to a
few of the principal forms of state taxation what impact the principles
advocated in the preceding section would have upon the course of
decision.
A. AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES
Instrumentalities of Commerce. Ad valorem property taxes today
account for approximately one-half of the total of state and local tax
collections. 7 At the time of the early cases dealing with state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce, these taxes were the only significant taxes
of general applicability, and produced the great bulk of state and local
revenue. 78 All property within a state was subject to such taxation, and
it would have been unthinkable to exempt property merely because it
was used in an interstate business. Hence the Court has consistently
recognized that a state has "the unquestioned right to place a property
tax on the instrumentalities engaged in . . . commerce." " Such
77. About 88% of local tax collections in 1951 came from this source. Supra
note 17.
78. In 1902, 82% of state and local revenues came from the property tax.
JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1931). In 1931 Jensen
stated: "From a fiscal point of view property taxes are now and always have been
more important than any other tax, and for state and local purposes in the United
States, more important than all other taxes together." Id. at 1.
79. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439, 445 (1894). The
early cases are discussed in Powell, Taxation of Things h; Tran.sit. II, 7 VA. L.
Rnv. 245, 246 (1921).
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taxes have been held to affect interstate commerce "only incidentally,"
and have been thought to be "not inconsistent with the constitutional
immunity from the imposition of direct burdens." s0
Apportionment problems have arisen from the migratory habits
of such items as railroad rolling stock and ships."- Over the years,
through a joint application of due process and commerce clause prin-
ciples, fairly satisfactory solutions have been reached. Ships which
cruise the high seas are taxable at the domicile of their owner unless
they achieve fixed situs on waters within another state."2 Freight cars
and barges which range from state to state are taxed by any formula
which operates to allocate a reasonable fraction of the total number
to the taxing state." Airplanes have proved more difficult; in the one
case which came before it the Court held that the state of home port
could tax total value without clearly indicating the rights of the other
states over which the planes operated.8 4 Aside from the airplane prob-
lem, the general statement of commerce clause principles made by the
Court in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning 5
represents as satisfactory a solution of the problem as is possible
through judicial decision alone:
"The guiding principles for adjustment of the state's right
to secure its revenues and the nation's duty to protect interstate
transportation are by this time well settled. The problem to be
solved is what portion of an interstate organism may appropriately
be attributed to each of the various states in which it functions.
Basic to the accomodation of these conflicting state and national
interests is a realization that by its very nature the problem is
incapable of precise and arithmetical solution."
The property tax has also given rise to classification problems
when the states have sought to go beyond valuation of tangible prop-
80. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15, 19 (1934).
81. The early cases are reviewed in Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7
VA. L. Rsv. 167, 245, and 497 (1920-21).
82. The cases are reviewed in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63
(1911). See also Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. Rxv. 167, 245,
and 497 (1920-21). And cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
83. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); American
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899) ; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891). Cf. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290
U.S. 158 (1933) (no apportionment); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275
(1919) (arbitrary apportionment formula). In the most recent case the Court
held that the state of domicile of the owner of river boats could not tax the entire
value when the boats were operated largely in other states. Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
84. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); cf. Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) ; Arditto, State and Local Taxation of Scheduled
Local Airlines, 16 J. Am L. & Com. 162 (1949).
85. 310 U.S. 362, 365 (1940).
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erty located within or allocated to the state to apply the property tax
to the system or unit value of interstate transportation and communica-
tion companies. Special statutes have provided for the assessment
of railroad, telegraph and express company property by formulas such
as that proportion of capital stock as miles of line (or property) in the
state bear to total miles of line (or total property)."" These statutes
have resulted in the application of the regular property tax rates to
values greatly in excess of the actual value of the physical property
in the state. In the Adams Express 8 7 case, for example, property
valued by the company at some $23,000 was assessed for tax purposes
at almost $500,000. In effect, what has been done is to impose the
property tax upon the intangible as well as the tangible property of
the companies. Yet businesses generally have been subjected to prop-
erty taxes only upon the actual value of their tangible property. While
there has been no discrimination between interstate and intrastate
transportation and communication companies, there has been the ob-
vious discrimination between such companies, doing largely interstate
business, and other forms of business.88 The Court has never faced
squarely this problem of discrimination. 9
Classification problems have arisen also in a series of cases up-
holding a Minnesota taxing statute which imposes upon certain trans-
portation and communication companies a tax measured by gross
receipts in lieu of all other taxes." This tax has been sustained as
being, in effect, no more than "what would be legitimate as an ordinary
tax on the property, taken at its real or full value." " But no close
examination has been made to see that this tax did not in fact result
in placing a higher tax burden on these predominantly interstate con-
cerns (in the Cudahy "2 case, for example, 90% of the freight cars
which gave rise to the tax were employed in interstate commerce)
than on intrastate activity generally. And in the most recent case the
86. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Wells,
Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U.S. 165 (1918); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State
Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 166 U.S. 185 (1897); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart,
163 U.S. 1 (1896); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894).
87. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 166 U.S. 185
(1897).
88. See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States. V., 32 HARv. L. REv. 234, 263 (1919).
89. It should be added, of course, that the cases do not seem to have been argued
on this ground. Ibid.
90. Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); Great Northern
Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246
U.S. 450 (1918); U.S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912). See
Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the
States. VI., 32 HARv. L. Rxv. 374, 399 (1919).
91. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450, 456 (1918).
92. Id. at 452.
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Court said that such a tax need have only "a fair relation to the prop-
erty employed in the state," " a standard which fails to suggest the
need for equivalency with the tax burden on other types of property.
The comparatively recent case of Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. v. Browning " demonstrates that in the eyes of the Court
the equal protection policy in favor of permitting broad legislative
classification completely outweighs any possibility of discrimination
against interstate commerce inherent in singling out predominantly
interstate types of businesses for special treatment. In that case the
assessment of the property of a railroad company was challenged.
Under the Tennessee taxing scheme, all property of public service cor-
porations was assessed by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commis-
sion, all other property by the county assessors. The railroad
contended that as a matter of practice the county assessors systemati-
cally valued property at far less than its full worth while utility and
railroad properties were assessed at full value. The Court, in a
unanimous opinion, sustained the tax. Without even considering the
possibility of practical discrimination against interstate commerce, the
Court restated the broad policy in favor of legislative classification for
tax purposes, and concluded: "Since, so far as the Federal Constitution
is concerned, a state can put railroad property into one pigeonhole
and other property into another, the only question relevant for us is
whether the state has done so." "
Admitting that the problem of discrimination exists in special
property tax classifications of the kind just discussed, should we now
say that the cases have been wrongly decided? A flat answer cannot
be given. Public service corporations in general, businesses such as
the railroad and telegraph businesses with their lines of trackage or
poles and wires extending through many states, are different from
other kinds of concerns. They cannot be realistically assessed by
county assessors. There are many legitimate reasons for singling them
out for special tax treatment which do not necessarily involve attempts
by the states to secure more than their fair share from the interstate
enterprise. And, as Professor Powell once said in discussing this
problem: 96 "A court cannot insist on an ideal system of state taxa-
tion, if such a thing can exist outside the minds of the doctrinaire.
A rough approximation to fair treatment of interstate commerce is
all that can reasonably be required." But on the other hand such
93. Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157, 164 (1940).
94. 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
95. Id at 369.
96. Powell, Indirect Ewroachmot on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers
of the States. V., 32 HAiRv. L. REv. 234, 264 (1919).
1953] "SUBSTANCE" vs. "FORM" OF COMMERCE CLAUSE 767
forms of classification may lend themselves to serious discriminations
against interstate commerce. In many states the amount which would
be extracted from out-of-state interests by a special tax on railroads,
for example, might so far exceed the burden on local shippers and
consumers as to tempt the legislature into imposing such a tax.
1 7
The principal difficulty with the cases in this field, then, has been, as
suggested earlier, that the Court has failed to see this discriminatory
possibility. Its frank recognition by the Court might not result in a
different decision in cases such as those which have come before it,
but it could well serve as a warning to the states not to push too far
the imposition of special property tax burdens on predominantly inter-
state businesses.
Goods in Transit. The rules, both commerce and due process,
governing the taxation of goods in transit in interstate commerce also
have long been settled. Goods within the state on tax day are taxable
if the interstate journey has not yet commenced, or has been sufficiently
interrupted, or has ended; but if the journey is in progress they are
completely free from taxation.98  These rules do not, of course, make
complete sense from a substantive commerce clause point of view.
The complete exemption of goods in transit is at least as likely (perhaps
more likely since shippers control shipment dates) to result in complete
freedom from taxation for the year as the rule of taxation would be
to result in double taxation. And should the tax day in the state of
origin fall before the transit started and in the state of destination
after it ended, the resultant double taxation would be just as burden-
some on commerce as if the two taxes had fallen while the goods were
actually moving. But the chief fault here lies in the use of an un-
apportionable tax day system of property taxation for movables, and
there seems no reason for upsetting the long settled tax practices in
this field.9 9
B. GRoss RECEIPTS TAXES
The largest single source of state revenue in 1951 was general
sales and gross receipts taxes which accounted for approximately one-
97. And as was pointed out in the first section of this article the economic effect
of taxes upon transportation and communication agencies is so diffused as to make
difficult a realistic assessment of benefits and burdens to a state from a particular tax.
98. The earlier cases are cited and discussed in Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S.
1 (1933). See also the discussion in Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331
U.S. 70 (1947) (a license tax case); Von Hamm-Young Co. v. San Francisco,
29 Cal.2d 798, 178 P.2d 745 (1947).
99. See the detailed analysis in Powell, Taxatiern of Things in Transit, 7 VA.
L. REv. 167, 245 and 497 (1920-21).
768 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
fifth of all state tax collections.' 00 The combination of general gross
receipts taxes and selective gross receipts taxes (on such items as
tobacco and gasoline) produced approximately three-fifths of all state
revenues.' 0 ' Sales taxes are also a rapidly growing source of revenue
for municipalities.'
A wide variety of gross receipts taxes are imposed by the states,
but only a few of the more common ones will be discussed here. Nearly
every state imposes taxes measured by gross receipts on some or all
types of public utilities. 03 In most states these taxes are special taxes
on public utilities and not part of a broader scheme of gross receipts
taxation. Thirty-one states impose general sales taxes and all but
three of these states have compensating use taxes.10 4  Three states
impose a tax at varying rates upon the gross income from a wide
variety of businesses or occupations, 0 5 and two states impose such a
tax upon substantially all businesses.'0 6 Indiana alone has a tax upon
gross income (including personal as well as business income) from
all sources within the state.
10 7
The early cases of state taxes upon gross receipts from interstate
commerce which came before the Court dealt largely with special taxes
on transportation and communication companies. With few excep-
tions 108 these taxes were held .invalid."00 By the opening years of the
100. U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATE TAX CoLLEcTIoNs IN 1951 2 (State
Finances: 1951, No. 4).
101. Ibid.
102. See Roesken, Recent State Tax Trends, 30 TAXES 9, 10 (1952), reporting
that approximately 150 municipalities in California have sales taxes but that there
are comparatively few in other states. The most important municipal sales tax is
that in New York City.
103. CCH, TAX SYsTEms 262 et seq. (13th ed. 1952).
104. Roesken, Recent State Tax Trends, 30 TAXES 9, 10 (1952); CCH, TAX
SYsTEMs 257 (13th ed. 1952).
105. Arizona, Mississippi, New Mexico. Id. at 257, 259.
106. Washington, West Virginia. New York City has a similar tax. Id. at 261.
107. Id. at 258; BLACK, THE INDIANA GRoss INCOME TAX (1950).
108. In State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. 284 (1873), a Pennsyl-
vania gross receipts tax applied to railroad, canal and transportation companies
incorporated under the law of Pennsylvania was held valid, partly upon the theory
that the state which created the corporation could tax its franchise in any way it
saw fit. In Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891), a gross receipts
tax for the privilege of doing railroad business in the state was upheld on the theory
that a state, having the power to exclude a foreign corporation, also had the power
to impose any conditions it saw fit upon the admission of such a corporation to do
business within the state. The theory underlying the Grand Trunk case was finally
repudiated by the Court in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
The story of these cases is told in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal A14-
thority by the Taxing Powers of the State. II., 31 HARv. L. REV. 572, 576 (1918).
Cf. Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. 456 (1875) ; Ficklen v. Shelby County Tax-
ing Dist., 145 U.S. 1 (1892) (tax on brokers).
109. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887); Philadelphia & S. Steamship
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887); Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
127 U.S. 411 (1888).
1953] "SUBSTANCE" vs. "FORM" OF COMMERCE CLAUSE 769
present century the rule was settled that any tax measured by gross
receipts which could not be said to be in lieu of property taxes "10 was
invalid to the extent that gross receipts from interstate commerce l'
were included, even though imposed upon a local subject and properly
allocated." 2 In this respect a distinction was drawn between net in-
come and gross receipts taxes. The former were held to affect inter-
state commerce only indirectly because the tax does not arise unless a
profit is shown and cannot be large unless the profit is large." The
latter were held to impose "a direct and immediate burden" upon
commerce because they were imposed without reference to the profit-
ability of the business and hence might "so diminish the profit as
to impede or discourage the conduct of the commerce." 114
While the Court thus talked in terms of the extent of the impact
of a gross receipts tax upon commerce, it is probable that its adverse
reaction to such taxes stemmed from their special character. Ad
valorem property taxes, which also applied without regard to the
profitability of a business and which might so diminsh the profit as to
discourage the conduct of a business, were, as we have seen, upheld.
They were (with few exceptions) general; everyone paid them, and
the normal political limitations served to control the amount. The
gross receipts taxes which came before the Court, on the other hand,
were designed to extract heavy tax revenues from particular businesses
which were largely interstate in character, and did present a substan-
tive danger that interstate commerce would be called upon to bear
special burdens.
More recently the Court has modified its position with respect to
gross receipts taxes as applied to transportation businesses. In one
case a tax on gross receipts was held properly applicable to an inter-
110. Cases cited stpra note 90. See also Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers,
191 U.S. 379, 387 (1903) ; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210
U.S. 217, 226 (1908).
111. In some cases the Court avoided the rule against the imposition of taxes
on gross receipts from interstate commerce by terming intrastate what was
essentially interstate business. New York v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549 (1915) (trans-
poration between two points in one state over a line running part way in another
state); Lehigh Valley PR. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192 (1892) (same); New York
v. Knight, 192 U.S. 21 (1904) (cab service between interstate ferry and homes of
patrons).
112. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908);
Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912). The early development is
discussed in detail in Powell, State Itwome Tcrxes and the Commoerce Clause, 31
YALE L.J. 799 (1922). Later cases applying the same rule include New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930) ; Fisher's Blend Station
v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) ; Puget Sound Steve. Co. v. State Tax'
Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422
(1947).
113. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328 (1918).
114. Id. at 329.
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state bus company on a basis of a mileage allocation." 5 In another
a franchise tax measured by gross receipts allocated on a mileage basis
was upheld as applied to a railroad doing both interstate and intrastate
business."' Earlier, however, the New York City general gross re-
cepits tax was held invalid as applied to the income of a stevedoring
company derived from loading and unloading ships engaged in inter-
state commerce even though all the activities giving rise to the income
took place within the city."1 And of course, the rule of the Spector case
forbids afy gross receipts tax in the form of a franchise or privilege
tax where the company concerned does a wholly interstate business.""
With respect to gross receipts taxes bearing upon the production
and distribution of goods, however, the Court has continued to require
the states to segregate intrastate and interstate gross receipts and to
forbid taxation of the latter. Two types of taxes are involved here:
those imposed upon retailing and those imposed earlier in the process
of production and distribution. Take first the sales and use taxes
which are imposed on retailing."' With respect to the sales tax, the
line was drawn in the early cases between interstate and intrastate
sales.' 20 Where, for example, a local merchant or peddler made a sale
of goods from a stock within the state, the sale was held to be an
intrastate sale and fully taxable even though the goods sold had come
115. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); see Barrett,
iupra note 6 at 524.
116. Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515 (1951). Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for a majority of six, stated: "It is settled that a non-discriminatory gross
receipts tax on an interstate enterprise may be sustained if fairly apportioned to the
business done within the taxing state . . . and not reaching any activities carried
on beyond the borders of the state. Where transportation is concerned, an appor-
tionment according to the mileage within the state is an approved method." Id. at
515. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter joined in an opinion "reserving judgment."
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson did not participate. Although the Canton case was not
referred to in the Spector Motor case decided shortly after, the cases are apparently
distinguishable on the ground that the railroad in the Canton case did some local
business. But cf. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (19s2).
117. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947). See Barrett,
supra note 6 at 522.
118. Both Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) and Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949), see discussion supra note 9, would
appear to be overruled by the Spector Motor case. However, the Court in the Spector
Motor case cited the Memphis Gas case for the proposition that a gross receipts tax
may be upheld where the taxpayer's business activity is "local in nature" and the Inter-
state Oil Pipe Line case for the proposition that where a taxpayer does some intra-
state business a privilege tax may be imposed and measured by both intrastate and
interstate business. 340 U.S. at 610.
119. Two types of sales taxes are common. One is a tax on the sales transaction
itself, collected by the retailer. The other is an excise for the privilege of engaging
in the business of selling, measured by the gross receipts from sales-a retailers occupa-
tion tax. BLAKEY, SALES AND OTHER EXCISES 5 (1945).
120. For a discussion of the cases, see Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate
Commerce, 52 H.Av. L. REv. 617 (1939) ; Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes:
The Berwind-White Case, 53 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1940); Johnson, State Sales Taxes
and the Commerce Clause, 24 CALIF. L. Rxv. 155 (1936); Johnson, Multi-State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Sales, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 549 (1939).
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from outside the state. 2 ' But where a sale resulted from orders
solicited by a drummer within the state, forwarded to the home office
in another state for acceptance, and filled by direct shipment to the
buyer, the sale was an interstate sale and assumed to be completely
immune from the tax. 22 Furthermore, it was assumed that sales of
this latter type would also be exempt from any sales tax imposed by
the state in which the seller was located.12
This pattern of decision made it difficult for states to impose
general sales taxes, since the result was to place local retailers at a
competitive disadvantage with respect to out-of-state retailers who
could sell to customers within the state free from the tax. As a result
the states, borrowing from the gasoline tax experience, 24 devised the
compensating use tax to reach goods which came into the state as a
result of nontaxable sales.' 2  This tax also had the advantage, in
cases of substantial purchases which could be detected, of preventing
local purchasers from evading tax by taking delivery of articles in
other states and then bringing them home for use. The Court has
upheld the application of the general use tax in all the cases which
have come before it on the theory that the tax is upon the local or
intrastate use and is not upon the interstate sale. 2 6 Charges of discrim-
ination against interstate commerce have been answered by pointing
to the fact that while goods acquired as the result of intrastate sales
were not subject to the use tax they were subjected to a sales tax of
121. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123 (1869); Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148
(1869) ; Banker Bros. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911).
122. The early cases involved fixed sum license taxes imposed upon drummers.
See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Lockhart,
supra note 120 at 620. The Court assumed, however, that the same rule would apply
to a sales tax on the sales. See Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515 (1923) ;
Lockhart, supra note 120 at 618. The first actual decision to this effect was in McLeod
v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
123. See, e.g., Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 295 (1917) (tax on
wholesaler shipping goods in foreign commerce).
124. Several cases upheld the application of a use tax to gasoline even though it
came into the state as the result of an interstate sale or was to be used to propel
vehicles engaged in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Bowman v. Continental Oil Co.,
256 U.S. 642 (1921); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932); Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). But cf. Helson v. Kentucky, 279
U.S. 245 (1929) ; Bingaman v. Golden Eagle West. Lines, Inc., 297 U.S. 626 (1936).
125. The leading case is Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). See
also Traynor, The California Use Tax, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 175 (1936); Warren &
Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COL: L.
REv. 49 (1938) ; BLAKEY, op. cit. supra note 119, at 18.
126. In addition to the Silas Mason, case the principal decisions have been: Felt
& Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182
(1939) ; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) ; General Trading Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944). In the Silas Masou. case the Court
said: "The tax is not upon the operations of interstate commerce, but upon the
privilege of use after commerce is at an end." 300 U.S. at 582.
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equal amount.' 2 7  The Court has not yet been required to decide
whether the commerce clause forbids a state to impose the use tax
on goods where delivery was taken in another state and a sales tax
paid in that state upon the sale. It has indicated that a use tax which
gives a credit for sales tax paid in the other state can validly be applied
in such a situation. 28
Although the sales and use tax combination enables states to tax
substantially all sales with respect to which they can get due process
jurisdiction over the seller for purposes of collection, there has been
considerable pressure to expand the permitted coverage of the sales
tax to take care of the few situations where the use tax cannot be
employed. 29 The Court has responded in part to this pressure. For
a time it was fhought that McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co.'30 and companion cases ' in 1940 gave permission to the state
of the market to tax even interstate sales. 3 2 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth
Co.'n in 1944, however, demonstrated that at least in situations where
a seller sent only drummers into a state the sales tax was invalid while
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm"n's 4 decided at the same time,
reaffirmed the applicability of the use tax in such a situation. More
recently, in Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue' 5 the Court held
127. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937).
128. In the Silas Mason case, the Court said: "We have not meant to imply by
anything said in this opinion that allowance of a credit for other taxes paid to Wash-
ington made it mandatory that there should be a like allowance for taxes paid to other
states. A state, for many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-contained unit, which
may frame its own system of burdens and exemptions without heeding systems else-
where. If there are limits to that power, there is no need to mark them now. It will
be time enough to mark them when a taxpayer paying in the state of origin is com-
pelled to pay again in the state of destination. This statute by its framework avoids
that possibility. The offsetting allowance has been conceded, whether the concession
was necessary or not, and thus the system has been divested of any semblance of
inequality or prejudice." Id. at 587.
129. E.g., sales to purchasers who for some reason are themselves exempt from
tax. In California, e.g., banks and insurance companies are exempt from such excise
taxes. CAL. REV. AND TAX C. §§ 12263, 23182 (Supp. 1947).
130. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
131. McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940). See also
Jagels, "A Fuel Corporation," v. Taylor, 309 U.S. 619 (1940) (per curtain opinion).
132. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes: The Berwind Case,
53 H v. L. REv. 909 (1940) ; Barrett, supra note 6 at 512.
133. 322 U.S. 327 (1944). See Barrett, supra note 6, at 516.
134. 322 U.S. 335 (1944). See Barrett, spra note 6, at 515.
135. 340 U.S. 534 (1951). The tax involved here was an Illinois retailers occupa-
tion tax. In distinguishing McLeod v. Dilworth, the Court said: "Where a corpora-
tion chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send abroad advertising or
drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance,
filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer has
no local grip on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the
transaction within its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable. . . . Of course, a
state imposing a sales or use tax can more easily meet this burden, because the impact
of those taxes is on the local buyer or user. Cases involving them are not controlling
here, for this tax falls on the vendor. But when, as here, the corporation has gone
into the State to do local business by state permission and has submitted itself to the
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that where a concern maintains a local selling branch within the state
any orders channeled through that branch or shipments delivered by
it may be subject to tax even though the sales involved are technically
interstate in character. Only orders sent directly by the customer to
the out-of-state factory and filled by shipment directly to the customer
were held immune from the tax.
With respect to the second class of taxes, those imposed earlier
in the process of production and distribution of goods, the Court has
been more generous with the states. Special taxes upon production
(severance, mining, manufacturing, generation of power, etc.) have
been sustained even though the goods produced have gone immediately
into interstate commerce.'36 Thus, in the leading case of Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord,17 a Minnesota tax of 6% of the value of all ore
mined in the state was upheld against a showing that 98% of the ore
was mined to fill contracts with out-of-state purchasers and was im-
mediately shipped in interstate commerce. In American Mfg. Co. v.
St. Louis,'38 a municipal license tax on manufacturing measured by
gross proceeds from sales of the goods manufactured was upheld as
applied to the proceeds from goods manufactured in St. Louis, sent
to warehouses outside the state, and there sold to out-of-state pur-
chasers. In upholding taxes of this character the Court has relied on
the theory that production is intrastate rather than interstate in charac-
ter and hence taxes upon production have only an indirect effect upon
interstate commerce.3
taxing power of the State, it can avoid taxation on some Illinois sales only by show-
ing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business and interstate
in nature." Id. at 537. Mr. Justice Reed dissented from the decision of the Court
that the tax could be applied to sales consummated as the result of orders taken by
the Illinois -branch office, forwarded to Massachusetts for acceptance, and shipped
directly from Massachusetts to the Illinois buyer. Justices Clark, Black, and Douglas
dissented from the decision that the tax could not be applied to sales consummated
as the result of orders sent directly by the buyer to the Massachusetts office and filled
by shipment directly to the buyer.
136. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (privilege tax measured
by value of natural gas produced as shown by gross receipts from sales of gas);
Lacoste v. Dep't of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924) (severance tax of 2% of the
value of all skins and hides taken from wild animals in the state) ; Oliver Iron Mining
Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (occupation tax equal to 6% of the value of ore
mined in the state); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). (tax of
13/2% of the value of anthracite coal when prepared for market); American
Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919) (city license tax on manufacturing meas-
ured by gross sales). Cf. Department of Treasury v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (excise tax on shrimp) ;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (excise tax on generation of electric
power). See Note, Natural Resource Taxation and The Commerce Clause, 30 TEXAS
L. REv. 96 (1951).
137. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
138. 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
139. See id. at 464.
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In this area of state taxation, great importance is given to the
label affixed by the state to the tax.1"' In J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen,141 for example, the Indiana general gross income tax was held
invalid as applied to the gross income from an Indiana corporation
which manufactured road machinery in Indiana and sold 80% of its
products to customers in other states and foreign countries upon orders
taken subject to approval at the home office. The Court distinguished
the American Mfg. Co. case on the ground that there the tax was on
the privilege of manufacturing-a local activity-whereas in the Adams
case the tax was on the gross sales which were themselves in interstate
commerce. The Court did suggest that the tax in the Adams case
would have been upheld if apportioned, but did not suggest by what
means the apportionment should be made.
The Court has had only limited opportunities to deal with gross
receipts taxes upon wholesalers and other distributors operating be-
tween production and retailing. There are dicta in two early cases to
the effect that gross proceeds taxes on wholesalers are invalid to the
extent that proceeds from sales which are consummated by delivery
to customers in other states are taxed.'42 More recently the Washing-
ton business activities tax measured by gross proceeds was held invalid
as applied to the entire revenue of a concern which marketed Washing-
ton-grown fruit in other states for a fixed return per box of fruit sold,
but with the suggestion that some form of apportionment would have
saved the tax."
In the field of gross receipts taxes, as elsewhere, more attention by
the Court to the problems inherent in narrow classification would
appear desirable. As noted above, special taxes on public utilities may
in the case of predominantly interstate enterprises lend themselves to
discrimination against interstate commerce. The same evil is inherent
in privilege or occupation taxes applied to a wide variety of businesses
where the rate varies with the particular type of business. Thus if oil
and gas pipeline companies in a state do an almost wholly interstate
business the normal political restraints on excessive taxation are mini-
mized when the legislature is fixing the special rate by which gross
receipts from such pipelines are to be taxed. Several recent cases
decided by the Court involved taxes which might be subject to objec-
140. See Powell, State Produciion Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 12 CAL.
L. REv. 17 (1923).
141. 304 U.S. 307 (1938). See Barrett, supra note 6, at 513.
142. See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 295 (1917) ; Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515 (1923).
143. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, Inc., 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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tion on this score.144 Since the cases apparently were not argued on
this point, however, it is not possible to tell whether interstate com-
merce was in fact subjected to discrimination in those cases.
Classification problems also arise in connection with special taxes
on production. Where the goods produced flow predominantly to
other states, the taxes levied fall more heavily upon extra-state interests
than upon intra-state interests, with the consequent danger that a dis-
proportionate share of state revenues will be sought from this source.
Where the state has no natural monopoly on the goods produced, this
danger is tempered by the fact that the state does not want to price
itself out of a market. Where there is substantial use of the product
within the producing state, local political restraints will operate to
control the tax. But where the state has a substantial monopoly of
goods which are necessities in other states (natural gas from Texas
and a few other states, anthracite coal from Pennsylvania, etc.), there
is little restraint upon the state.'45 As Professor Powell put it: ...
"When... a state by imposing a tax on a selected enterprise reaps a
revenue from citizens of other states and imposes no corresponding
burden on its own citizens, the rapacity of the taxing state has no
political or economic limits other than a cautious instinct not to kill
or maim the goose that lays the golden eggs."
Whether the Court has been right or wrong in upholding the
specific production taxes which have come before it cannot now be
determined. Nor is it argued that all special taxes of this kind should
be held invalid. The state which has unique natural resources has
some special governmental obligations with respect to them and, per-
haps, some equitable claim to obtaining special public as well as private
revenues from their development. 4' But the Court should recognize
the dangers to commerce involved in production taxes and keep the
door open to nullify them in the extreme cases where it is clear that
commerce has been substantially burdened.
The most difficult problem with reference to gross receipts taxes
is that of proper allocation. In the field of public utilities taxation,
interstate commerce problems arise most often in connection with
interstate transportation and communication companies. Mileage al-
144. See, e.g., Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951) (special tax on public
utilities at varying rates) ; Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949)
(privilege tax on selected occupations at varying rates) ; Central Greyhound Lines v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) (special tax on the gross receipts of public utilities).
Cf. the treatment of the discrimination point in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner,
Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
145. See Federal, State, and Local Government Fiscal Relations, SEN. Doc. No.
69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1943).
146. Powell, State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 12 CAIJF. L.
REv. 17, 21 (1923).
147. See id. at 23.
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location formulas, which have recently won Court approval in general
terms, appear to be roughly satisfactory here and to present no prob-
lems substantially different from those involved in the field of property
taxation.
In the application of gross receipts taxes to retail sales, however,
there has been no attempt to impose or require general allocation
formulas. Instead each sale has been treated as a unit, either fully
taxable or fully exempt, as the case may be. Certainly where sales
taxes as opposed to general gross income taxes are involved, such
treatment of the allocation problem appears inevitable. Unfortunately,
however, the Court's use of the distinction between intrastate and
interstate sales as a basis for allocation has resulted in formal distinc-
tions without substantive justification. Why should interstate sales
be exempted from the sales tax only to fall prey to the use tax? Why
should a sale negotiated through a drummer and followed by shipment
direct to the buyer be exempt from sales tax while a sale negotiated
through a branch office followed by a similar shipment directly to the
buyer is taxable? In this field it would seem desirable for the Court
to recognize frankly the pattern which has largely been worked out
by the states themselves: Each state should be permitted to impose
its sales tax upon all sales, regardless of the manner in which they
are negotiated, which result in a delivery of goods to a buyer within
the state. Conversely, states would be forbidden to impose a sales tax
upon any sales, even of goods produced locally and sold by local re-
tailers, where the goods are delivered to the buyer in another state.
148
Furthermore, states should be permitted to impose a use tax upon
goods when the purchaser has taken delivery in another state at least
where credit is given for sales taxes paid in the state of delivery.
149
General gross income taxes should be subject to the same limitations
to the extent that they apply to retail operations.Y5
0 This pattern of
148. The arguments for taxation by the buyer's state only are elaborated in
Snell, Sales Taxes and Interstate Connerce, 27 TAXES 37, 47 (1949).
149. The question of whether states should be permitted to impose a use tax
upon goods where the purchaser has taken delivery in another state without permitting
a credit for taxes paid there is a difficult one. On the one hand, commerce is clearly
put at a disadvantage if two taxes must be paid. But on the other hand, the admims-
trative difficulties in checking to see if taxes actually have been paid in other states
may be insuperable. See Traynor, supra. note 24, at 184; and Powell, New Light on
Gross Receipts Taxes- The Berwind-White Case, 53 HARv. L. Rxv. 909, 931 (1940).
150. Where a general gross iniome tax is involved, it would he possible to apply
a general allocation formula of the type used in connection with net income taxes. But
since allocation in connection with the more widely used sales taxes is on the basis
of the individual sale, uniformity demands the same type of allocation with respect
to general gross income taxes. In cases arising under the Indiana tax the Court
has approached the matter in both ways. In J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307 (1938), the Court appeared to be thinking of the use of a general allocation
formula. In International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944),
however, it approved an allocation of the specific sales.
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decision would mean that in any particular market all goods would be
subject to the same gross receipts tax burden upon selling operations;
and with respect to such taxes interstate goods would be treated equally
with intrastate goods.
To the extent that the states impose gross receipts taxes upon
wholesaling operations, it would seem that the rules should be similar
to those applied to retailing. Each state should be permitted to collect
that tax on, and only on, the proceeds of all wholesale sales where
delivery is made to the retailer within the state, regardless of the
location of the seller.
Production taxes measured by gross receipts present different
problems. If a manufacturer is taxed upon his entire gross receipts
from all sales made within and without the state, the measure of the
tax reflects both manufacturing and selling values. To the extent
that it represents selling values, it duplicates in part the sales tax and,
where sales are made outside the state, reflects in part values attribut-
able to out of state activity. Perhaps here the fairest solution (if the
administrative problem of valuation can be solved) is to require that,
insofar as interstate sales are involved, production taxes shall be
measured by the value of the goods when produced, rather than by
sales price." 1
But, it will be argued, to permit the application of gross receipts
taxes to manufacturing as well as to retailing is to impose the risk
of undue burdens on the interstate flow of goods. If a tax is paid
on the full value of the goods as produced in one state and on the full
sale value in another state, multiple burdens can be said to have re-
sulted. The answer to this argument comes, I think, in an analysis
which keeps separate the taxes imposed at various stages of the pro-
ductive process. In any particular market, then, the goods will all
bear the same tax upon retailing. Goods coming from one state may
also have been subjected to a manufacturing tax. But local goods
and goods from other states may have paid a similar tax, or they may
have borne at least as heavy a tax burden in other forms, such as
higher property taxes, license taxes or net income taxes. Competitive
equality can never be assured. If the state of the market taxes all retail
sales (local and interstate) at the same level and no other state is
permitted to tax such sales, and if the state of origin of the goods
151. In Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927), the Court suggested
such a limitation. However, American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919),
which permitted measure of the tax by sales price, has since been frequently cited
by the Court with approval. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 255 (1946) ;
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve. Co., 330 U.S. 422, 431 (1947) ; J.D. Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 312 (1938) ; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250, 257 (1938).
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taxes all producers (those who do only a local business and those
selling in interstate commerce) equally, the Court will have given
as much protection as possible under our federal system.
C. NET INCOME TAXES
Net income taxes, now one of the three principal sources of state
revenue, 152 have presented relatively few commerce clause problems.
The first cases to come before the Court involved general taxes allo-
cated to income arising within the state, and were sustained on the
theory that a net income tax imposed only an "indirect and incidental"
charge upon commerce.35 In all the subsequent cases the imposition
of net income taxes has been upheld 154 except where an attempt has
been made to impose a franchise or other privilege tax measured by
net income upon the income from a concern doing a wholly interstate
business."' Prior to the Spector case a clear line of distinction was
drawn between taxes "on" net income, which could be applied even
to the wholly interstate business, and privilege taxes measured by net
income which could not be imposed on such a business!"' Since
the opinion in Spector does not refer to the "on" net income cases,
their continuing validity is now subject to at least some question.
1
57
No serious problems of classification have arisen in connection
with net income taxes. The most common form of classification is
between the tax on individuals and on corporations. 5" Some states
impose graduated rates on individuals and a flat rate on corporations.
Some impose the tax only on business corporations and exclude indi-
viduals. Other variations appear. But these classifications are so broad
as to present no substantial danger of discrimination against inter-
state commerce. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of discrim-
152. U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1951 (State Finances
1951, No. 4) 3.
153. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328 (1918) ; Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S.
113 (1920).
154. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923); Matson
Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936); Wisconsin v.
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940); Memphis Natural Gas Co: v.
Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942) ; West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
155. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U.S. 203 (1925) ; Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
156. Compare West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), with
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U.S. 203 (1925). The distinction is dis-
cussed in detail in the opinion of the California Supreme Court in West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946).
157. See Clark, Interstate Commerce and a State's Right to Revenue: A Re-
joinder, 30 TAXEs 263 (1952) ; and cf. Cox, Interstate Commerce and a State's Right
to Revenue, 30 TAxEs 25 (1952).
158. CCH, TAX SYsTEMs 173 (12th ed. 1950).
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inating between incorporated and unincorporated business, no serious
commerce clause objection can be made.
In this field the Court has been faced with some difficult decisions
regarding the fairness of particular allocation formulas.' The limita-
tions of the judicial solution of the apportionment. problem are well
illustrated by the net income tax cases. 6 ' In only one type of case,
however, has the Court suggested any limit on the general requirement
of allocation. The due process clause has been interpreted to permit
the taxation of residents and domestic corporations upon entire net
income wherever earned. 6' While the Court has yet to give full con-
sideration to a case directly presenting the problem of a tax imposed
upon the entire net income of a domestic corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce in more than one state, it has been assumed that such
a tax would be valid.6 2 Whether as a matter of policy such taxation
should continue to be permitted is a difficult question. In Gwin, White
& Prince v. Henneford, Inc.' 3 the Court held invalid an unapportioned
gross receipts tax as imposed upon a domestic corporation with an
opinion discussing at length the burdensome consequences to commerce
from such a tax. Certainly the net income tax imposes a similar bur-
den, lesser perhaps only in degree of severity. Yet on the other hand,
there are problems of state policy. So far as taxes on individuals are
concerned, the principle of progressive taxation might be evaded if
the entire income of residents could not be considered. Furthermore,
there is the fear that much of the income earned in other states may
for various practical reasons escape taxation anywhere if not taxed
at home. With respect to corporations these local policies are not
quite so strong, especially since corporation taxes are less frequently
made progressive.
Further consideration of this problem by the Court may be long
postponed since the trend is toward its elimination by voluntary state
action. Many states now provide for allocation as to residents under
their personal income taxes, and all but three or four states provide
for such allocation as to domestic corporations under their corporate
159. E.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
160. ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. supra note 45, demonstrates the limitations in
detail. See also Cox, Uniformity of State Income Taxation, 30 TAXES 184 (1952).
161. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) ; Lawrence v. State
Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
162. ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. supra note 45, at 30; cf. Rock Island Refining
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 711 (1944) (per curiam opinion dismissing
appeal "for want of a substantial federal question"). In two commerce clause cases
the application of a net income tax to domestic corporations was upheld without
examination of the particular allocation formulas used. Matson Navigation Co. v.
State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441 (1936); United States Glue Co. v. Oak
Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
163. 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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income taxes.164 And most of those states which do not permit allo-
cation provide some sort of credit for taxes paid in other states. 65
However, the problem may be raised in a slightly different form by
the recent changes in two or three states denying apportionment of
corporate income by corporations which do not maintain a permanent
or continuous place of business outside the state.'
66
D. LICENSE, PRIVILEGE AND OCCUPATION TAXES
Many of the early cases which came before the Court involved
license, privilege, occupation and similar taxes. Certain specific taxes
of this type have already been discussed, but treatment will be given
here to a few problems common to taxes of this kind.
The first difficulty arises from the fact that the terminology of
license and privilege taxes often suggests that the states are granting
special privileges for which the taxes are payment and that failure to
pay will result in denial of the license and exclusion from that partic-
ular type of business. 67 The Court has made it clear since the
earliest cases that the states have no power to exclude concerns from
doing an interstate business. 68 And the Court has gone further to
hold that even though no attempt is made to exclude, such taxes are
invalid because the federal government, and not the states, is the source
of the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 69 Thus the
Court said in the Spector Motor case that by virtue of the commerce
clause the federal government has "the exclusive power to tax the
privilege to engage in interstate commerce." 170
A second difficulty arises from the fact that many of the license
and privilege taxes are fixed-sum taxes. Taxes of this kind have
always distressed the Court. They bear no relation to business done
or profits earned and hence may easily be made prohibitive in charac-
164. See the chart in ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. supra note 45, at 15-18.
165. Id. at 204.
166. Roesken, Recent State Tax Trends, 30 TAXES 9, 13 (1952).
167. In one of the earliest cases in which the Court held a license tax invalid
the statute provided for an injunction against carrying on the business without pay-
ing the tax. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884). In the important early
case of Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888), a $225 license fee was imposed
on a telegraph company doing both interstate and intrastate business and a fine of
from one to fifty dollars was imposed for each violation of the ordinance. The Court
posed the problem: "Can a State prohibit such a company from doing such a business
within its jurisdiction, unless it will pay a tax and procure a license for the privilege?"
Id. at 645.
168. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 167; Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396
(1893).
169. E.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951);
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 88 (1948) ; Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 'U.S. 47 (1891) ; see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 677
(1949) (dissent).
170. 340 U.S. at 608; see supra note 65; Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc.
v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
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ter. They are especially adapted, as the Court has realized, to ex-
cluding or hampering interstate business when the same flat sum tax
is imposed, for example, upon the local merchant as upon the out-of-
state vendor who may operate only episodically in the state."'
Finally, most taxes of this character have been special rather than
general. Cities have imposed license taxes upon particular classes of
businesses. State privilege taxes have been imposed upon selected
enterprises. Most of the cases to come before the Court have been
those where railroads 172 or telegraph companies 173 or ferry boats 174
or peddlers 17 or drummers 7' have been singled out for special taxa-
tion which involves at least the possibility of discrimination against
interstate commerce.
Instead of looking at these problems in terms of the economic
impact of the taxes on commerce, however, the Court has dealt with
them at a formal level. If the taxes have been imposed upon interstate
commerce-for example, a flat sum license tax on the doing of tele-
graph business in the city where both interstate and intrastate business
is done 177 -they have been held invalid. If they have been imposed on
intrastate business-for example, a flat sum license tax on the doing
of intrastate telegraph business in the city 7Ts-they have been sus-
tained. This approach 17 has been at best only a partial solution to
171. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454
(1940) ; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) ; see McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Min. Co., 309 U.S. 33, 55 (1940).
172. E.g., Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886) (Pullman
cars)
173. E.g., Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Cooney v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935) (telephone instruments).
174. E.g., Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U.S. 333 (1914).
175. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941).
176. E.g., cases cited supra note 171.
177. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888) ($225 license fee on telegraph
companies held invalid); cf. Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384
(1935) (tax on telephone instruments).
178. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U.S. 692 (1894) ($500 license
fee on the intrastate business of a telegraph company held valid).
179. The fullest recent statement of the traditional approach is in Cooney v.
Mounain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384, 392 (1935): "There is no question
that the State may require payment of an occupation tax from one engaged in both
intrastate and interstate commerce. But a State cannot tax interstate commerce; it
cannot lay a tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the privilege
of engaging in it. And the fact that a portion of a business is intrastate and there-
fore taxable does not justify a tax either upon the interstate business or upon the
whole business without discrimination. . . . Where the tax is exacted from one
doing both an interstate and intrastate business, it must appear that it is imposed
solely on account of the latter; that the amount exacted is not increased because of
the interstate business done; that one engaged exclusively in interstate commerce would
not be subject to the tax; and that the one who is taxed could discontinue the intra-
state business without also withdrawing from the interstate business." For a fuller
citation of the early cases see Barrett, supra note 6, at 500. But cf. Chicago v.
Willet Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953) upholding an occupation tax on a trucker doing
both an intrastate and interstate business stressing the fact that the taxpayer was
a domestic corporation doing its principal business in the city.
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the problem. Businesses doing exclusively interstate commerce have
been freed from state taxes of this type. But businesses doing both
intrastate and interstate business (including most of the transportation
and communication companies) have been subjected to the same exac-
tions with the same dangers to interstate commerce. The burden of
a $225 a year municipal license tax is just as great when the subject
of the tax is the doing of intrastate telegraph business within the city
as when it is the doing of business generally in the city. °80 The same
classification problems with their possibilities of discrimination are
present. True, as the Court has pointed out,'8 ' such taxes can be
avoided by ceasing to do the intrastate business. But this is rarely a
practicable alternative. The Court has suggested that there are some
limits in how far states can go in taxing the intrastate business of
concerns which also do interstate business, 82 but has rarely found
them even when the intrastate business has been done at a loss. sa  In
the field of peddler and drummer taxation, the Court has painted a
dark picture of the discriminatory impact on commerce of flat sum
license fees upon drummers,8 but has turned a deaf ear to the pleas
of peddlers on the ground that their business has been intrastate in
character. 5 Yet the consequences of the taxes in excluding commerce
has been substantially as great in the one case as another, at least in
those areas where the custom of the trade has made it impossible to
shift to the drummer type of business.
The extent to which the Court has gone in this field in upholding
state taxes which impose serious burdens on commerce and levy, in
effect, special tolls on commerce flowing into other states is indicated
180. Compare the cases cited supra notes 177 and 178.
181. E.g., Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U.S. 420, 422 (1903) : "The company can-
not complain of being taxed for the privilege of doing a local business which it is free
to renounce." Cf. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936).
182. The early cases are discussed in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States VII, 32 HARv. L. REv. 634, 671-678
(1919).
183. There is a full discussion of the problem in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936), where railroads and a telephone company challenged
a tax on their local business on the basis of a showing that the local business was
operated at a loss and that practical considerations prevented abandoning such busi-
ness. The Court said: "But no reason has been suggested why a tax upon the local
business should be held void . . . if, although conducted at an apparent loss, the
corporation desires to continue it because of benefits present or prospective." Id. at
414. See also Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Fremont, 255 U.S. 124 (1921); Williams v.
Talladega, 226 U.S. 404 (1912).
184. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 171:
185. The most recent of many cases is Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S.
117 (1941); and cf. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389
(1952).
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by the recent case of Independent Warehouses v. Scheele.' Inde-
pendent Warehouses operated within Saddle River Township, New
Jersey, a storage facility, where anthracite coal was brought from
Pennsylvania mines and stored on intransit privileges until shipped
on, chiefly to New York City consumers. This storage permitted
movement of coal from the mines during the period of the year when
production exceeded consumption and movement to consumers at the
period when consumption exceeded production. The Township enacted
an ordinance providing that "No person, firm or corporation shall
conduct or carry on the business of the storage of personal property
in a warehouse engaged in storing goods for hire . . . unless and
until there shall be granted by the Township Committee of the Town-
ship of Saddle River in accordance with the terms of this ordinance,
and shall be in force and effect, a license to conduct said business for
the place and premises in or at which said business shall be conducted
and carried on." For the license there was charged and collected in
advance an annual fee of three-quarters of a cent for each square foot
of ground in the Township where the business was carried on, and
severe criminal penalties were provided for operating without the
license. Here was a case with as much potential for discriminating
against interstate commerce as any to come before the Court. So far
as appeared (the dissent tells us).. Independent Warehouses was the
only concern affected by this special tax. Since the tax would ulti-
mately be passed on to consumers of the coal in other states, the Town-
ship could levy a tax of any amount without economic impact upon
its own residents. Mr. Justice Jackson in dissenting (with Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson) commented:
"But here the ultimate burden of the tax falls on consumers
in New York and elsewhere who have no representation in the
government which lays the tax and fixes its amount. The
authorities who fix the tax will never have to answer to those
who pay it. . . . If it is valid, I know of no reason why the
community should bear any of its own tax burdens." 18
Yet the majority of the Court sustained the tax on the analogy
to taxes dealing with ad valorem property taxes on goods. Within
the precedents, the Court said, this was a sufficient interruption of the
interstate transit to permit local property taxation. Therefore this
tax was permissible. But the problem here was different from that
186. 331 U.S. 70 (1947).
187. Id at 95.
188. Id. at 94.
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in the property tax cases. In the latter cases the Court was dealing
with a general nondiscriminatory tax in which the rate was necessarily
limited by its impact on all property owners within the taxing juris-
diction. In such a situation the burden on interstate commerce would
at least be limited by the local political influence of other property
taxpayers. But here there was a special tax, freed of any substantial
local limitations upon its amount. The fact that the storage of coal
might within the precedents properly be determined an intrastate rather
than an interstate activity had no bearing upon the substantive effect
of this tax upon interstate commerce. That effect would have been
not one whit more serious had the coal still been in the stream of
commerce, yet there the Court would have held it invalid.
What should be the policy of the Court in this area of taxation?
Granted that the line forbidding such taxes when imposed directly upon
interstate commerce and permitting them when upon intrastate com-
merce or a local incident of interstate commerce 11" does not make
substantive sense, still it does relieve some commerce from the burden
of special and potentially discriminatory state taxation. Can a line be
drawn which does make better economic sense? It would be possible,
of course, for the Court to say that no business which is engaged in
interstate activity shall be subjected to special taxes of this character,
even upon its intrastate business. In justification the Court could
say that with the wide permission given to use general taxes measured
by net and gross income there is no longer any necessity for inequitable
special taxation. An intermediate position would be a rule that any
special or flat sum license, privilege, or occupation tax will be viewed
with suspicion where in practical effect it imposes a burden on inter-
state commerce. Thus a tax on the intrastate business of a railroad
will be treated the same as a tax on its interstate business; a tax on
a peddler the same as on a drummer. The Court could then make a
practical examination of the situation,00 and sustain only those taxes
where local administrative or other necessities appear to outweigh the
possible impact on commerce flowing from actual operation of the tax.
Such an approach would put a greater burden on the Court, but it
seems the only realistic way to treat the problem at the judicial level.
189. The doctrine that a local incident of interstate commerce could serve as the
subject of state privilege taxation was worked out principally in Coverdale v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938) (license tax on gasoline engines used to
operate compressors on interstate pipe line) and Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
335 U.S. 80 (1948) (privilege tax on the local activities of maintaining and keeping
in repair an interstate pipeline). See Barrett, supra note 6, at 510 and 525.
190. Such as that made in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best &
Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
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E. MOTOR VEHICLE TAXATION
Motor vehicle and motor fuel taxes combined represent the largest
source of revenue in many states, often running as high as 50% of
total state revenues.'' These taxes also present some of the most
complex commerce clause tax problems, problems too complex to per-
mit more than an outline here.
This area of state taxation is unique in that taxes are imposed
according to the benefits received rather than to the ability to pay.19'
Through motor vehicle and fuel taxes the great bulk of the cost of
maintaining roads is assessed directly upon the people who use those
roads. These taxes do not represent merely a contribution to the
general costs of government; they are treated as compensation for
special services provided by the state.
Many difficult problems of allocation are raised for solution by
the states.' In the first place, a determination must be made of what
proportion of road costs is properly assigned to general tax revenues
to pay for the more generalized public benefits from the roads as op-
posed to that proportion to be assigned directly to users. In the
second place, the user portion of the tax burden must be allocated
fairly among the various classes of users. What proportion of the
tax should fall upon automobiles? Upon trucks? Upon busses?
What principles should govern this allocation? Amount of use? Wear
and tear resulting from use? Benefits derived from the use? Should
commercial operations bear a heavier load than private operations?
Finally, within the various established classifications levies must be
apportioned between interstate and intrastate users of the roads in such
a manner as to meet objections based upon the commerce clause.
While there are wide variations in detail, a general pattern of
state taxes in this field can be determined.'94 The basic user taxes
in all states are registration fees and fuel taxes. Registration fees
normally vary according to the type or weight of the vehicle and not
191. CCH, TAX SYSTEM s 305, 306 (13th ed. 1952).
192. Zettel, Taxation for Highways in California, 1 NAT. TAX. J. 207, 209 (1948);
Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Co~nlnerce, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71, 72 (1951).
193. These problems have been widely discussed. Among the recent literature
are the following: COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNI'MENTs, HIGHWAY SAFETY-MOTOR
TRUCK REGULATION 112 (1950); MACDONALD, A FACTUAL DISCuSSION OF MOTOR-
TRUCK OPERATION, REGULATION, AND TAXATION 56-76 (Dep't of Commerce, Bureau
of Public Roads, 1951); NAT. Ass'x TAX ADMINISTRATORS, A PRACTICAL PROGRAM
TO IMPROVE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE HIGHWAY USE (1952); NATIONAL HIGHWAY
USERS CONFERENCE, THE TON-MILE TAX (1950); WESTERN HIGHWAY INSTITUTE,
HIGHWAY TAXATION PROBLEMS: A SYNOPSIS (Tech. Bull. Series No. 3, 1950);
Zettel, supra note 192; Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Comnmnerce, 100 U. or PA.
L. REv. 71 (1951).
194. The taxes are summarized in COUNCIL OF STATE GOvERNMENTS, op. Cit. supra
note 193, at 105-110.
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by the extent of use of the roads. Duplication of such fees is to a
certain extent prevented by reciprocity provisions. Fuel taxes, imposed
at varying rates per gallon, are usually a combination of sales and use
taxation. In addition to these two types of taxes, a number of states
impose additional taxes upon common carriers commonly measured
by mileage, ton-mileage, or gross receipts. In most instances these
special taxes are imposed by states which have a relatively small num-
ber of registered vehicles in proportion to the road system which they
maintain and hence (through the operation of reciprocity provisions)
are not able to rely upon the registration fee as an adequate revenue
source.
19 5
The commerce clause rules governing motor fuel taxation and
the problems arising therefrom are substantially similar to those already
discussed in connection with general sales and use taxes. 90  But with
respect to motor vehicle taxation the Supreme Court has devised
special rules which have the effect of giving the states a much freer
hand in obtaining revenue from interstate carriers than they enjoy
in other fields of taxation. In the first two cases 17 to come before it
the Court upheld registration fees even where the proceeds exceeded
the cost of regulation on the theory "that where a State at its own
expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in
commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation
therefor." 198 In the third case the Court upheld a special tax on motor
transportation companies as applied to a trucking company doing a
wholly interstate business within the state:
"The highways are public property. . . Users of them, al-
though engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, may be re-
quired to contribute to their cost and upkeep. Common carriers
for hire, who make the highways their place of business, may
properly be charged an extra tax for such use." 19
Shortly thereafter the Court frankly recognized that it was apply-
ing special rules in this field:
195. Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Commerce, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71,
80 (1951).
196. Among the recent cases are McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S.
176 (1940); Bingaman v. Golden Eagle West. Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936); Wiloil
Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S.
86 (1934) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U.S. 249 (1933). The earlier cases
are collected in Note, 80 L. Ed. 931 (1936). The most difficult problems have arisen
out of state attempts to assess a tax on fuel purchased outside the state but consumed
inside as part of an interstate operation. See, e.g., the Dixie Greyhound and Golden
Eagle cases, supra.
197. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160 (1916).
198. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624 (1915).
199. Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 (1927).
1953] "SUBSTANCE" vs. "FORM" OF COMMERCE CLAUSE 787
"While a State may not lay a tax on the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce . . . it may impose even upon motor
vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce a charge, as
compensation for the use of the public highways, which is a fair
contribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining them and
of regulating the traffic thereon .... As such a charge is a direct
burden on interstate commerce, the tax cannot be sustained unless
it appears affirmatively, in some way, that it is levied only as
compensation for use of the highways or to defray the expense
of regulating motor traffic." 200
The emphasis in most of the cases has been upon making a deter-
mination whether the tax has been imposed as a charge for the use of
the highways or upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Express allocation of the proceeds of the tax to highway purposes has
been held to indicate the compensatory nature of the tax.2" 1 A statutory
declaration that the tax is imposed to secure compensation for high-
way use has also been held sufficient even though the funds collected
are not expressly allocated to highway use.202 More recently the Court
has become concerned with the question of whether even taxes imposed
as compensation do not also have to bear some relation to road use.
In 1950 in Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 3 the Court held that
so long as the taxes imposed on carriers by the state do not exceed fair
compensation for the use of the highways, the formula by which par-
ticular taxes are imposed is irrelevant. A titling tax of 2% upon the
value of all vehicles purchased for use within the state was upheld even
though the tax obviously bore no relation to the extent of road use.
The Court said that taxes upon motor carriers have been invalidated
only upon finding that:
"(1) the tax discriminated against interstate commerce in
favor of intrastate commerce; (2) the tax was imposed on the
privilege of doing an interstate business as distinguished from a
tax exacting contributions for road construction and maintenance
or for administration of road laws; or (3) the amount of the tax
exceeded fair compensation to the state." 204
This emphasis by the Court on compensation as the key to deci-
sion has tended to obscure the very difficult problems of possible dis-
200. Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 185 (1931).
201. E.g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n, 295
U.S. 285 (1935) ; and see Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 (1931).
202. E.g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S.
495 (1947).
203. 339 U.S. 542 (1950). The dissenting opinion contains a useful appendix
analyzing all of the prior cases dealing with motor vehicle taxation. Id. at 561. See
also Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953).
204. Id. at 544.
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crimination against interstate commerce involved in many forms of
motor vehicle taxes. Flat sum taxes or other taxes which do not in
some way reflect the extent of road use are very apt to work a practical
discrimination against interstate commerce. Take the Capitol Grey-
hound case as an example. Each of three interstate bus companies
bought a new bus with the intent of using it on one of its routes within
Maryland. The Maryland portions of the three routes were 9, 41,
and 64 miles respectively. The titling taxes computed on the fair
market value of each vehicle were $505, $580, and $372, respectively.
Thus one interstate company paid $505 for 9 miles of route and another
$372 for 64 miles of route, yet an intrastate bus company for a similar
charge might have operated a bus on a route hundreds of miles in
length. All taxes of this character discriminate in favor of the constant
user of roads within the state and, in the generality of instances, against
the interstate operator whose use of the local roads is apt to be less
extensive. In dealing with this problem the Court has said, in a case
involving a flat sum tax:
"The fee is for the privilege of a use as extensive as the car-
rier wills that it shall be. There is nothing unreasonable or op-
pressive in a burden so imposed .... One who receives a privilege
without limit is not wronged by his own refusal to enjoy it as
freely as he may." 205
This argument, however, overlooks the serious burden which would
be placed upon interstate commerce by the multiplication of levies
of that kind; the very nature of the business indicates that the inter-
state carrier will not make as full a use of the state highways as the"
intrastate carrier.
So far as registration fees are concerned, the general enactment
by the states of reciprocity provisions has removed much of the poten-
tialities for discrimination against commerce.20 The result of the
Capitol Greyhound case, however, may well be to stimulate other
special types of state taxes which are not subject to reciprocity.
The basic commerce clause problem is whether the state interest
in securing revenues for the construction and maintenance of roads is
so great as to permit taxes which has such potentialities for discrim-
ination against interstate commerce. This question can be answered
realistically, of course, only if one knows the feasibility of alternative
methods of taxation. Can a mileage tax, for example, be devised which
205. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Conm'n, 295 U.S.
285, 289 (1935).
206. See Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Commerce, 100 U. oF PA. L. REV.
71,81 (1951).
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makes a rational allocation among all highway users and the collection
of which is administratively feasible? Or can the states better solve
the problem by increasing the fuel tax as a substitute for taxes unrelated
to road use? What is the impact of each of these types of taxes on
the local problem of securing a fair allocation of road costs among the
various classes of users? Legislative rather than judicial solutions ap-
pear to be indicated in this complicated field.'" However, judicial
recognition of the potentialities for discrimination against commerce
involved in many motor vehicle taxes might at least stimulate the states
to greater activity in their search for better alternatives.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The states themselves have made some attempts to minimize bur-
dens on interstate trade. Most states have either refrained from
exercising their rights to tax residents and domestic corporations on
their entire net income or else have allowed credits (frequently on
a reciprocal basis) for such taxes paid elsewhere. °8 Progress has also
been made in securing the adoption of similar types of apportionment
formulae in the net income tax field. °9 Most states have reciprocity
provisions which alleviate what would otherwise be an intolerable
burden on interstate commerce from duplicated state registration fees
on motor vehicles.210 It is unlikely, however, that any real uniformity
will ever be attained by interstate cooperation. Many if not most states
can always be counted on to take the position that "although uniformity
is desirable it should be attained by the process of amending other state
laws to conform with theirs."21' Efforts toward interstate cooperation
should always be encouraged, but hope cannot be held out for any
startling results.
Congressional action will be successful in proportion to the extent
to which it interferes with state autonomy in the matter of taxation.
The basic problem, as pointed out earlier, is the existence of indepen-
dent taxing jurisdictions with no compulsion towards uniformity. All
207. The problem has recently been the subject of Congressional hearings: Hear-
in.qs before Subcommittee on Domestic Land and Water Transportation of the Com-
fnittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pursuant to S. Res. 50, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950). See Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Commerce, 100 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 71 (1951).
208. See notes 164, 165 supra.
209. ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. supra note 45. Tax administrators have them-
selves worked toward the use of uniform formulas whenever permitted by local statutes.
A committee of the National Tax Association has worked on the development of a
proposed uniform state income allocation tax law.
210. Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Commerce, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71,
79 (1951).
211. ALTM!AN & KESLING, Op. cit. supra note 45, at 248; Sutherland & Vinciguerra,
The Octroi and the Airplane, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 169 (1946).
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the problems of barriers to free flow of trade from taxation would be
eliminated by the simple expedient of superseding state taxes by a
national tax or taxes, with the net revenue to be allocated back to the
states.212  The savings in administrative costs alone would be tre-
mendous and the cost of compliance factor for interstate business would
be greatly lessened. But the barriers to the successful adoption of such
a proposal are, at least for the foreseeable future, insuperable. The
problems of allocation of revenue among the states would be compli-
cated and difficult, and state autonomy would be at an end if the states
were dependent on the federal government for revenue.
Various other proposals have been made for congressional ac-
tion."1 Space will permit the discussion here, and that only briefly,
of the one proposal which appears to have some possibility of adoption
because it would minimize the worst state burdens on commerce with-
out substantially impairing the independence of the states. This pro-
posal was made with respect to net income taxes by Altman and
Keesling in their book, Allocation of Income in State Taxation. In
the discussion which follows, however, it has been generalized to
suggest its application to other types of state taxes.
The essential idea is that uniformity in state taxation can be
achieved with the least federal interference in local matters by legisla-
tion which prohibits the states from taxing interstate commerce or
its avails except by certain specified forms of taxation.
To illustrate. With reference to property taxes a federal statute
could provide that property used in the interstate transportation of
goods and passengers-ships, railroad rolling stock, barges, airplanes,
trucks, etc.-may not be taxed except by the application of allocation
formulas spelled out in detail for each kind of property. Such a statute
would insure that no more than 100% of the value of the property
would be subject to taxation, and would also greatly simplify the
accounting and reporting problems of the carriers. The statute could,
if desired, go further and either ban special forms of property taxes
on the property of interstate carriers or specify the formulas which
212. See discussions in ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. Cit. supra note 45, at 249; Snell,
supra note 148, at 46; Sutherland & Vinciguerra, supra note 211, at 168.
213. Among the recent literature are the following: ALTMAN & KESLING, op. Cit.
supra note 45, ch. 12; Arditto, State and Local Taxation of Scheduled Local Airlines,
16 J. AIR L. & Com. 162 (1949); Browne, Federal-State Tax Coordination," 31
CORNELL L.Q. 182 (1945) ; Cox, Uniformity of State Income Taxation, 30 TAXES 184
(1952) ; Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HIARv.
L. REv. 949 (1941); Saxe, Federal Control of the State Taxation of Airlines, 31
CORNELL L.Q. 228 (1945) ; Schlesinger, Sales Taxes, Interstate Trade Barriers, and
Congress: The Gulf Oil Case, 39 MIcH. L. ZEv. 755 (1941); Snell, supra note 148;
Sutherland & Vinciguerra, supra note 211; Note, Taxation of Interstate Motor Com-
inerce, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71 (1951).
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could be used by the states in allocating unitary or system value for
local taxation.
In the field of net income taxation the statute could forbid the
taxation of income from interstate commerce except by a specified
uniform allocation formula. It could also provide a uniform definition
of residence. Or the statute could even go so far as to specify many
other standards which the state statutes must meet as a condition of
taxing the income from interstate business.
Other illustrations could be multiplied since this technique would
appear adequate to solve the major interstate commerce problems
involved in all forms of state taxes. One important advantage of this
approach is that a gradual beginning could be made and coverage
expanded as experience dictated. Thus, the first task might be to
prescribe a uniform allocation formula for net income taxes. The
experience gained there could be applied to prescribing allocation for-
mulas for other forms of taxation.
The problems involved in the detailed drafting of such statutes
will not be easy 214 Even the problem of working out a uniform
allocation formula for net income taxation presents serious difficulties.
For example, a formula that produces a large allocation to an industrial
state may give such a small allocation to an agricultural state as to
be unfair. If reasonable compromises of conflicting interests are to
be made, extensive Congressional hearings and careful committee work
will be essential. And in the end the problem may'prove too compli-
cated for detailed statutory treatment, and may have to be turned over
to an administrative agency governed by general statutory standards.215
214. See note 213, supra.
215. See Sutherland & Vinciguerra, supra note 211.
